

---

# The American Quarterly on the SOVIET UNION

---

Vol. I

OCTOBER, 1938

No. 3

- CC 10
- Soviet Children's Literature - - - - - Simon Doniger  
The Russian Army - - - - - George Fielding Eliot  
Territorial-Administrative Structure of the USSR J. A. Morrison  
Franco-Soviet Relations - - - - - Albert Parry  
The New Soviet Elections - - - - - Rose Somerville



Published by

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE, Inc.

AUG 19 1939

35 cents

---

# THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

The American Russian Institute is an American non-political membership organization formed in 1926 for the purpose of promoting cultural relations between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union particularly by making available accurate information concerning cultural, scientific and educational activities in both countries. It is a non-profit corporation governed by a Board of Directors elected annually by the membership and is supported entirely by subscribers, members, contributors and foundations. In the United States it aims to serve as an authoritative clearing house for factual information concerning the Soviet Union. Although it maintains no office in the USSR its New York headquarters furnish the Soviet Union with information on the United States whenever it is requested. In addition to the New York office there are in Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco local organizations which are similar in purpose and avail themselves of the services of the Institute, although they are not directly affiliated with it.

## ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE

- **PUBLICATIONS:** In addition to *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union* the Institute publishes semi-monthly a four-page *Bulletin on the Soviet Union* which contains short articles giving background material on current events in economic, social and cultural fields. This *Bulletin* is regarded as a necessary supplement to the *Quarterly*, and for this reason the two publications may only be subscribed to together.
- **LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICE:** The Institute maintains a library of current Soviet newspapers and periodicals, reference books and source material. Through its Information Service the requests of the general public are answered, and in addition, a certain amount of special work is done for members of the Institute.
- **EXHIBITS:** The Institute distributes each year a number of exhibits on various fields concerning the USSR. This material is shown by universities and other institutions throughout the United States.
- **DISCUSSIONS:** In New York City the Institute holds conferences, lectures, dinners, concerts and receptions.

## MEMBERSHIP

Membership in The American Russian Institute is subject to the approval of the Board of Directors. Members receive all publications, special services from the library and invitations to all the functions of the Institute. Membership in the Metropolitan area is \$5.00 per year and outside this area \$3.00 per year.

## BOARD OF DIRECTORS

MRS. KATHLEEN BARNES, AARON BODANSKY, EDWARD C. CARTER, MRS. ETHEL CLYDE, LOUIS CONNICK, GEORGE S. COUNTS, WM. O. FIELD, JR., LEWIS GANNETT, MORTIMER GRAVES, WM. S. GRAVES, ALCAN HIRSCH, JOHN A. KINGSBURY, MARY VAN KLEECK, WM. W. LANCASTER, WILLIAM LESCAZE, WILLIAM ALLAN NEILSON, RAYMOND ROBINS, GEROLD T. ROBINSON, JOHN ROTHSCHILD, MRS. RICHARD B. SCANDRETT, JR., WHITNEY SEYMOUR, HENRY E. SIGERIST, LEE SIMONSON, VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON, GRAHAM R. TAYLOR, ALLEN WARDWELL, MRS. EFREM ZIMBALIST.

# The American Quarterly on the SOVIET UNION

VOL. I

OCTOBER, 1938

No. 3

## Table of Contents

	PAGE
Children's Literature in the Soviet Union, <i>by Simon Doniger</i>	3
The Russian Army, <i>by George Fielding Eliot</i> .....	19
The Evolution of the Territorial-Administrative Structure of the USSR, <i>by J. A. Morrison</i> .....	25
The Evolution of Franco-Soviet Relations, <i>by Albert Parry</i>	47
The New Soviet Elections, <i>by Rose Somerville</i> .....	59
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	
Marshal Vasili Konstantinovich Bluecher .....	80
NEWS CHRONOLOGY	
June, July, August—1938	
INTERNAL AFFAIRS .....	85
Administration, Agriculture, Arctic, Art, Aviation, Industry, Transportation, Miscellaneous.	
FOREIGN AFFAIRS .....	88
European Affairs, Far Eastern Affairs, United States, Miscellaneous.	

## EDITORIAL BOARD

HARRIET MOORE, *Editor*

KATHLEEN BARNES

WILLIAM O. FIELD, JR.

AARON BODANSKY

KITTY GELLHORN

VIRGINIA BURDICK

JOSEPH PHILLIPS

ROSE N. RUBIN

The BULLETIN ON THE SOVIET UNION, published semi-monthly by the Institute, is a necessary supplement to THE QUARTERLY in providing information and background material on current developments in the USSR. For this reason the two publications are sold together at a joint subscription price of \$2.00 per year.

*In all Institute publications effort is made to ensure the accuracy of statements of fact. The responsibility for the opinions expressed in the articles published in THE AMERICAN QUARTERLY ON THE SOVIET UNION rests solely with the individual authors. The Editor is responsible for the selection of the authors and the acceptance of articles.*

*Published by*  
THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE  
for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, Inc.  
56 WEST 45TH STREET  
NEW YORK CITY

COMPOSED, PRINTED AND BOUND BY UNION LABOR  
AT THE ACADEMY PRESS, NEW YORK, N. Y.  
MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

# CHILDREN'S LITERATURE IN THE SOVIET UNION

By

SIMON DONIGER

"Knowledge is useful only when, like salt, it is used and offered in small measures according to the people's circumstances and their needs . . . to teach the masses of the people or even the majority of them how to read will do them more harm than good."

Thus did a minister of education under Tsar Alexander I summarize the attitude of the Tsarist State toward education.

There is no better gauge of the revolutionary change which has taken place in the Soviet Union than the juxtaposition of the attitude expressed by Alexander I's minister, and the attitude of the Soviet State on the question of popular education. A splendid example of this changed attitude is the organized effort of Soviet educational authorities in relation to the problem of children's literature.

Soviet authorities began stressing the importance of the book, particularly the children's book, as an instrument of social education immediately after the Revolution. Lenin, even during the turbulent years of 1919 to 1923, constantly wrote and spoke on behalf of the development of library and other facilities for the distribution of books, and on the creation of new cheap books that could come easily within the reach of the entire population. Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, who was then a chairman of the Scientific Council of the People's Commissariat of Education was another champion of the children's book as an important educational instrument, as were M. Gorky, A. Lunacharski, Stalin, Semashko, and many other outstanding educators and leaders. It was one thing, however, to stress the importance of children's literature and quite another thing to develop the necessary materials. Krupskaya tells of an interest-

---

Simon Doniger is the executive director of the Jewish Child Guidance Bureau. He has made several trips to the Soviet Union where he conferred with authorities on children's literature. The above article is taken from material in his Ph.D. thesis for New York University on "Children's Literature in the Soviet Union."

ing incident during the years of civil war when the country was overrun with homeless children. An attempt was made to treat these children by sending to them individuals who as a part of the treatment tried to read to them, but there were no books that could evoke any sort of a response from these children. Krupskaja said:

Here are 17-18 year old adolescents, sick of life, with shattered nerves, and we try to amuse them by reading to them books that cannot possibly touch them. These children might be moved by tales of struggle—struggle with nature, struggle with need, struggle with human beings. They undoubtedly would be fascinated by tales of our Revolutionary War or stories that would show them how much of real interest there is in life; stories that would make them feel the poverty of their own life and would awaken in them a desire to tear themselves away from it.

### ***Pre-Revolutionary Children's Literature***

There was very little in the pre-Revolutionary literature for children that could be used for the new Soviet child. Children's literature before the Revolution, while large and varied, was far from a satisfactory instrument of social education. On the whole it was divided into two rigidly separate categories. On the one hand there was the so-called entertaining literature, or fiction. This consisted primarily of imitations of the romantic sentimental novel of western Europe exemplified best by *Little Princess Nina*, by Lydia Charskaia. On the other hand there were the so-called useful and informational books, books of knowledge full of facts and figures, but thoroughly dull. Ilin, one of the outstanding children's authors of the Soviet Union, says about these books:

The old books, as I recall them, consisted almost entirely of names and lists of gulfs, straits, islands, peninsulas, animals, plants, peoples, and governments. It was like a catalogue of some huge warehouse—everything was numbered and labelled: population, so and so; so and so many cows, so many horses, sheep, and pigs; so many square miles. . . . Everything had its own shelf.

In addition to the categories, there were, of course, the *skazki* or folk-tales which dealt in much simpler terms and much more realistically with the everyday life of the people. But even here



the Government censor succeeded in transforming this vital, dynamic, and profound folk literature into an instrument for its own use. Whatever was questioning and critical or too realistic was carefully rooted out so that even this literature in the end became devoid of all realism and relevance to the child's contemporary life. The collections of *skazki* were chosen for their moral value in preaching humility and acceptance as in the story of *The Fisherman, His Wife and the Miraculous Goldfish*. All critical reference to the State or to religion was taboo. Thus the censor substituted a merchant for the priest in Pushkin's *Story of the Priest* and omitted many significant lines in his other *skazki*. Pushkin writes in his diary:

The censor did not permit the following poem in my *Story of the Golden Cockerel*:

Reign while lying on your back  
The story is a lie  
But there is a hint and lesson in it for a smart fellow.

There were also, of course, some materials of children's literature both in the field of poetry and prose written by contemporary writers for adults which were important social documents and, at the same time, fine artistic creations. A fine example of such poetry is the following poem of Nekrasov which found its way in to many children's anthologies:

#### THE UNMOWN PATCH

Late Autumn: the rooks have flown  
The fields are empty and the woods wind blown  
All but a thin patch of overripe rye  
Lonely and melancholy a far away sigh  
As if the stalks plaintively moan:  
"Lonely and sad is the late autumn wind  
Bitter to spill our ripe grains alone;  
Why are we punished? How have we sinned?  
Night after night we are tattered and torn;  
Bent low to the ground evening and morn  
By rabbit, and bird, and late Autumn blast  
Where is our reaper? Won't he come at last?"  
But the wind brings an answer: "Weary and sore  
Your reaper has no strength left for you any more."

(Translation by Simon Doniger)

Most of this material, however, was so full of allegory and symbolism that its real message remained a mystery to the young readers.

It is no wonder that old Russia's children turned from these books to the numberless editions of detective stories of Nat Pinkerton, Sherlock Holmes, and Nick Carter. It is these, together with Lydia Charskaia's *Little Princess Nina*, that became the reading materials of children—materials which were of very little value under the new post-Revolutionary conditions. As Marshak, one of the leading Soviet children's writers, put it:

What we needed was an altogether different kind of a book, one synthesizing a courageous realism with an even more courageous romanticism—a book which would not be afraid to face the inevitable and difficult facts of life and yet would be able to lift our children to a height of optimism from which these facts would no longer be terrifying.

### ***Early Post-Revolutionary Literature***

It was one thing, however, to be aware of the need for these new books and another one to create them. The early years immediately after the Revolution of 1917, like all similar eras of violent struggle, were not very conducive to great artistic activity in the field of art generally, nor in the field of children's books.

As the basic problems of illiteracy, book production, and distribution, were gradually met, the Soviet Union found itself faced with the infinitely more subtle and difficult problem of the actual writing of children's books—the problem of content and form. The early years of the Revolution permitted the Soviet educational authorities very little time or leisure for the examination of this problem.

Faced with animosity and active antagonism on all sides, there had been no choice but to develop a new generation of trained personnel—teachers, technicians, soldiers, and administrators out of the untrained and ignorant masses of workers and peasants—to take the place of those who refused to serve the Revolution. In terms of this program the Soviet State was faced with a double task: that of training these new experts in their profes-



sions, and in addition to that, as was felt urgently necessary, of training them politically—for only then would they become loyal dependable workers of the Soviet State. Every possible tool was harnessed to that purpose, and to children's literature, which was always considered by the Soviet authorities an important form of education and social control, naturally fell an important part of this process. For the same reason, children's literature of those early years reflected so much of the hysteria, extremism, and anti-traditionalism with which the early years of the post-revolutionary period were filled; for this was an era when faith in the past and its accumulated experience was greatly undermined; the old had failed, they said, and its teachers and technicians had either run away or were refusing to work with the new Soviet State. The book itself was considered a "bourgeois" remnant. They even called for bookless schools and attacked grammar as unnecessary.

While all this was particularly true of the first few years—the years of War Communism—these problems carried over into the next era—the era of the New Economic Policy, 1923-1929. Because of the special social situations which the introduction of the New Economic Policy had created through its re-establishment of private industry on a limited scale—situations which resulted on the one hand in disillusionment and cynicism about the Revolution, and, on the other hand, in a strengthening of agitation and propaganda in the school and in children's literature—this period was even more difficult. And the first Five-Year Plan, the era of "social reconstruction" of the years 1929-1933, which followed the New Economic Policy, brought ever new problems to the field, through its emphasis on machinery and technique, frequently at the expense of interest in man and his own individual problems.

This, too, was directly reflected in the children's literature of that day, in the substitution of political phraseology, moralizing and preaching for ideas and creative art forms. Instead of providing the children with a real insight and understanding of Communist ideology and its problems they gave them only phrases, passwords, and slogans. Often these books lacked even the one quality that the old literature did have—an emo-

tional appeal which plays so important a role in children's literature. The writers tried to teach Communism at any cost. The theme became all-important. The question of method and form was lost sight of, with the result that a great many of these new books became either pedantic dry political treatises or were reduced to mere sets of rules on hygiene, physical culture, etc.

For example, a great many of the books for children of those years were written primarily for the Young Pioneers—the vast organization of Soviet children which serves as the source of supply for the future membership of the Communist Party. These books were designed to teach these children in a simple, though thorough, way the problems with which Communism was supposed to deal. One of the problems which was stressed very much was the unity between children of all nations, the brotherhood of man, the theme of internationalism. Yet most of the new books written for that purpose could hardly be said to fulfill that function. For instance, a book widely used with this in mind was Gralitz's *The Children's International*, published in 1926. The book begins with a call to children of all lands to come to the Commune "Lenin's City" where they will all labor together. Many children answer the call—from the Caucasus, from France, Arabia, Turkey, and America, with the result:

Where before all was an empty lot  
Or only dirt and garbage was  
Now there are growing in profusion  
Cucumbers, carrots, and cabbages.

Thus the noble theme of internationalism is reduced and simplified to the growing of vegetables without any attempt to give the children any of the basic concepts underlying this theme of unity.

Agnevitz's *Children of Many Colors*, another widely read book, published in 1928, reduces the same theme to rules of hygiene:

We unanimously demand  
That you do not loaf in bed  
That daily you must wash  
And keep your fingers out of your nose

While Jimmy Joy, the hero of Lydia Liesnaia's book of the same name:

Doesn't eat sunflower seeds  
Washes his hands before meals  
And doesn't drink unboiled water

The antagonism against everything that was a heritage from the old quite naturally included also the *skazki*—the Russian folk tales, together with all other imaginative writing which did not bear any obvious relation to reality or did not perform the immediate function of teaching the children Communism, dealing with mechanics, or in general giving them some concrete knowledge of the world around them.

Anderson and Grimm's fairy tales, the *Adventures of Baron Munchausen*, the Greek Mythological tales, all became the center of violent discussion and criticism at every educational and literary conference. Not only the literary periodicals but even such political newspapers as *Izvestia* and *Pravda* were filled with attacks on this brand of literature and their effect on the mind of the young reader. "This literature is both useless and harmful," these educators and critics insisted. "Not only does it not contribute anything positive, but it interferes with the proper orientation of the child to reality. The talking animals, the witches and fairies, the flying carpets of this literature only serve to confuse the child and to interfere with the scientific upbringing of the child," they argued. Even Krupskaja attacked Pushkin's *The Fisherman, His Wife, and the Miraculous Goldfish* as being harmful.

Krupskaja represented the least dogmatic and most mature critic of those days. Her criticism stemmed from a profound knowledge of both literature and children. The same could not be said of the great majority of the critics of children's books of that day. By and large these were immature inexperienced zealots with great sincerity but little understanding of children's needs and art-forms. Their formula was a narrow utilitarianism, and everything that did not fit into that formula was rejected. Books had either to explain Marxism or to deal with machinery or cattle breeding; if they did not, these critics claimed, they were just that much waste of paper and effort,

at a time when funds and energy were urgently needed to produce the basic elements of existence. In their zeal the critics totally overlooked the difference in the needs of children, in terms of their age and capacities and demanded that even "the education of the pre-school child must be polytechnical."

### *Recent Trends in Children's Literature*

The relative release from the tension of the earlier turbulent years of civil war and reconstruction, the greater leisure and security that came with the completion of the first Five-Year Plan and the collectivization of agriculture gave the Soviet authorities their first breathing spell and opportunity to evaluate their accomplishments and failures. The new generation of teachers and parents could now be trusted with the job of running the school and the family, and it was no longer necessary to juxtapose the State versus the old teacher and the old parent. The family again emerged as an important instrument in the building of character and personality and was no longer considered a stifling, thwarting influence on the future development of the child. At the same time, other values, until now disregarded or even violently attacked, came in for reconsideration. The experience and cultural heritage of the past began slowly but consistently to emerge as a valuable tradition upon which all new values must rest, rather than as a dead burden which stifled the spirit of the new.

The individual and his personal problems, submerged for so long under the stress of the earlier post-Revolutionary years, again came into his own, and while the basic purpose of the Revolution, "the building of Socialism," remained unchanged, the methods and road to it received a new and different emphasis.

This changed attitude was reflected in all phases of educational and cultural activity—in the schools, in the organs of official propaganda and education, and in adult literature.

Children's literature, for years under the influence of the earlier extremism, also became subject to the new trend. Slowly at first, but with constantly gathering momentum, the Soviet educators began critically to examine their accomplishment in this field during the earlier decade. They found it wanting at

many points and, with characteristic soul-searching, there began a process of self-criticism and reconstruction.

Since about 1928, yearly conferences have been held to discuss the problems which have arisen in the field. A special commission was appointed to make a thorough study of the old pre-Revolutionary children's literature for the purpose of sifting out of it that which might be useful for the present. Children's literature played an important role in the 1934 First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers; the folk tales were re-examined, as well as other imaginative materials.

By 1937 most of the remnants of the sectarianism of the earlier era had disappeared and there was no longer any question of the value of imaginative writing for the child. Thus, an editorial in *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, of May 26, 1937, declared:

The child's sensitiveness requires some satisfaction in fantasy, romantic flights, and the unusual. These should be utilized for making him a fighter for socialism, a man of knowledge.

Even the *skazki* which had been criticized by Krupskaja were no longer found to be harmful and dangerous and on the contrary were now considered both valuable and beautiful creative products.

A much greater concern was also shown in children's literature for the personal life of the child and its inevitable conflicts, as against the earlier preoccupation with political and social themes. The conflicts and problems which arose out of competition, love and the ego were beginning to receive a place which they did not have during the earlier years. Thus, *Komsomolskaia Pravda* printed newspaper items and editorials calling attention to the existence of these problems and the refusal of adults either through life or through literature to deal with them.

Thus, slowly learning through its past mistakes, there developed in the Soviet Union a new attitude and awareness of children's literary needs. The fanatical passion of the earlier era which attempted to convert every children's book into a treatise on Communism, but which, instead, became a valueless and unattractive schematization, is no longer. The writer of

children's books today is no longer circumscribed by a narrow range which hinders him from using all of his creative ability. In addition, an entirely new range of writers from the ranks of professionals—scientists, hunters, divers—have been brought into the realm of children's literature, vastly enriching it. As a result, the reading range of the child had been greatly widened. Social content and the "building of Socialism" still remains the goal of the Soviet educator, but these goals no longer eliminate such invaluable literary materials as the folk-tale, the Greek myths, and the classics. All these, together with new books, are at the disposal of Soviet children today.

### *Leading Authors*

Of all children's authors the two that are most frequently on the lips of Soviet children are S. Marshak and Kornei Chukovski. Wherever one goes, in city or village, in the far north or in the Crimea, one hears their poems quoted, played to and danced to.

Marshak became interested in children's literature shortly before the Revolution. His awareness of children's literary needs made him revolt against the school of children's literature typified by Charskaia's *Little Princess Nina* and out of that grew his fascinating joyous children's poetry.

No translation can do justice to Marshak's poetry, to his idioms, to his play on words, and to his use of vivid details and beautiful expressive rhythms. That is probably why few have as yet attempted to translate him into English, while numerous translations of Ilin and Chukovski are available to the English reader. It is difficult to convey in fragments the full significance of Marshak's poetry, and because of that the writer has attempted in his inadequate way to give at least one full translation of a complete work, retaining as much as possible of Marshak's original rhythms.

### THE POST

[A story of the mail and of a letter that is trying to catch up with the ever travelling Soviet citizen, Comrade Mostov from Nizhni (accent on last syllable). It follows him on a trip around the world and finally reaches him at home again at Nizhni.



The poem is told in vivid, dancing rhythm, typical of Marshak—rhythm that constantly changes to suit the mood of the subject matter and through which one can almost hear the different movements of the “ship, and train and aeroplane.” At the same time it is full of humor, and characteristic descriptions of the people of the countries through which the letter travels.]

Who is it knocking at my door  
With heavy bag on shoulder hanging  
With number five on brassy badge  
And heavy boots on sidewalk clanging?

It is he  
It is he  
Our postman from Nizhni

He today has very many  
Letters in his heavy bag  
Both from Tambov and Tiflis  
And from far away Paris

Early, seven in the morning  
He began his work today  
And by ten the bag got thinner,  
By noon he gave it all away.

Here's a 'registered' from Rostov  
For our comrade—Comrade Mostov.  
What, a 'registered' for Mostov?  
Comrade Mostov went away  
Flew to Berlin yesterday

Across the border Comrade Mostov  
Flying smoothly, way up high,  
While from Nizhni starts a mail train  
Will it catch him by and by?

And the train is full of letters  
All the shelves so neatly placed.  
All night long two Russian postmen  
Sort the mail in great haste.

A package to Dubrovka  
A postcard to Pokrovka  
A paper to the station at Klim  
A letter to Makovka  
Another to Tambovka  
And a 'registered' to far away Berlin.

Here goes the Berlin postman  
With mail just now received  
All dressed in fine attire  
His buttons shine like fire  
His trousers neatly pressed  
Like a scientific test.

Around him people hurry  
And automobiles scurry  
Using lots of gasoline  
In the great town of Berlin

Our postman arrives at the door  
To the porter politely he bows  
'A letter for number four'  
'Herr Mostov? er geht doch heraus.'  
Only yesterday at five o'clock  
He left for England at the dock.

A letter  
By itself  
Can't anywhere go  
But put in a box  
Over mountains and rocks  
It will fly  
It will swim  
It will row

All over the world  
It can travel  
Without any ticket at all  
For just a few coppers  
Without any suppers  
A passenger  
In an envelope

For all along  
Its long, long way  
It does neither drink nor eat  
And only one thing does it say:  
London—fourteen—Bobkin Street.

The streets are full of busses  
Rushing back and forth  
The roofs are full of billboards.  
Swinging to and fro,  
The conductor from his seat  
Shouts 'Everybody out—Bobkin Street!'

On Bobkin Street, on Bobkin Street  
Carrying the mail  
Is walking quickly Mr. Smith  
As thin as a rail

At No. 14 he arrives  
And bangs on the door with the knocker  
'A letter for Mr. Mostov'  
'Mostov,' says the hallman, Bill,  
'Left last night for Brazil.'

The steamer  
Will leave  
In a minute or two  
The cabins are full  
Of the passengers' baggage  
All except one  
That's reserved for the mail  
Across the ocean to sail.

Beneath the tall palms  
All done with the heat  
Walks Don Basil  
Hardly moving his feet

In his hand is a letter  
All soiled and stained  
With many foreign postmarks  
From lands far and famed

And on the letter it is written  
That the addressee  
Returned some two, three days ago  
To Russia—to Nizhni

Who is it knocking at my door  
With heavy bag on shoulder hanging  
With number five on brassy badge  
And heavy boots on sidewalk clanging?

It is he  
It is he  
Our postman from Nizhni

Once again he brings with him  
The 'registered' from Rostov  
That travelled almost half the world  
In search of Comrade Mostov

Over valleys and over hills  
And across the ocean wide  
With ship and train and aeroplane  
Till now its by his side.

Glory to the honest postmen  
Tired—weary—overworked  
Glory to the honest postmen  
Who never have their duty shirked.

(Translation by Simon Doniger)

K. Chukovski is another children's poet who even before 1917 revolted against the falsehood, sentimentality, futility of pre-Revolutionary children's literature, and began writing for children in an altogether new idiom, a method which grew out of years of intimate study and living with children at their camps, at homes, at Pioneer clubs, and everywhere that children congregate. The results of this intimate study of the psychology and language of the child are evident in such poems as *The Crocodile* (translated into English by Babette Deutsch), *Moidodyr*, *The Cockroach*, and numerous other popular poems.

In America, the best known writer for children is M. Ilin whose *New Russia's Primer* was translated into English by Professor George S. Counts, and whose numerous other books such as *Black on White*, *What Time is it?*, *100,000 Whys*, *Turning Night into Day*, and *Men and Mountains* have been made available to the English reader through the splendid translations of Beatrice Kinkead.

Ilin typifies the achievements of Soviet children's literature. His books have bridged the gulf between books for children and adult literature and are read by both children and adults with equal interest. He achieved this result by being thoroughly honest with his material and never sacrificing scientific truth or fact to merely being interesting or amusing. Yet, in spite of this factual honesty, his works remain amusing, fascinating and exciting. His success is, at least in part, due to his sensitive and imaginative use of subtitles which succeed in catching the imagination of the reader, and at the same time encompass, in a dramatic, living way, the content of the chapter. Such titles as "100,000 Whys," "A Decree Against the Elements," "Memory's Helpers," "The Living Alarm Clock," "Bread is Coal," "A Plan for Treasure Hunters," are typical of the skill with which Ilin utilizes words and concepts. His stories are full of amusing episodes, but never irrelevant ones. His sub-

ject matter and the individual things with which he deals in his stories are never chosen artificially or arbitrarily, but are always left in their organic or natural unity—in their natural relationship to the thing he is describing.

Ilin accomplishes a great deal more, however, than merely giving honest, practical knowledge. Always knowledge, science, and work are related to a social purpose which attempts to make the reader a lover of work and an eager student of science because it will enable him to build a better world for human beings to live in.

Besides Marshak, Chukovski, and Ilin, there are a large number of other writers who are contributing to the field of children's literature. It is very difficult to classify these writers into categories; many of them are writers for both adults and children; most of them write for both the very young child and the older child. Nor is it easy to classify them according to the subject matter of their writing, for one of the characteristics of the new Soviet children's book is that it can no longer be pigeonholed into such categories as fiction, the scientific book, the travel book, or the animal book.

Another characteristic of these writers is that many of them are not professional writers at all; they are industrial, professional, or scientific workers, who through the efforts and training of Soviet literary and educational authorities have succeeded in bringing to Soviet children the wealth and romance of their experience and work: railroad men, hunters, divers, engineers, astronomers, geologists, mathematicians, who, either alone or in collaboration with professional writers, write books which portray the realities of their work and its relation to society.

Only a few of these writers and their works can be referred to in this article. There is, for instance, K. Paustovski, whose title *Kara-Bugaz* is a thrilling story of the reconstruction of a desert, of the struggling victory of man over nature; or M. Loskutov's *The Thirteenth Caravan* written in a similar vein; or K. Zolotovskii's *Under Water Mechanics* (translated into English as *Deep Sea Divers*), a fascinating, vivid portrayal of the everyday life of a diver; or N. Grigoriev's *One and a Half Conversations*, the story of railroading; or K. Merkulieva's

*The Factory of Exactness*, a dramatic story of the relation of weights and measures to the social life of the Soviet Union; or the splendid books of B. Jitkov: *The Telegraph*, *The Book*, *About the Elephant*, and *About the Monkey*; or the fine stories of M. Prishvin, the hunter and folk-lore specialist; the works of V. Bianchi another outstanding children's writer; or V. Kataev's *I, the Son of the Toiling Masses*, a story of the Civil War; L. Panteleev's *The Packet*, *The Watch*, and *The Republic Shkid*; Leo Kassil's *Shvambrania*; A. Gaidar's *The School*, *The Military Secret*, and numerous other new works. All these books combine knowledge and social purpose with fine creative method.

Thus, through conscious planning and constant effort the Soviet authorities have developed a literature for their children which is as wide in scope as life itself, imaginative and yet realistic, a literature which is being created by Soviet Russia's finest writers, scientists, and workers from both the city and country. In addition, splendid results have been achieved in the field of children's books, especially remarkable being their dynamic illustrations which are done by the country's leading artists. Here and there one still finds occasional failures, such as Gaidar's *Military Secret* which contains so many of the faults of the books of the earlier era, or Jitkov's *Little Uncle*, or even Kassil's *Uncle Belomor*. But these books are exceptions rather than the rule. On the whole the great mass of books for children are of a high literary quality combining fine artistic creation with materials of important social significance.



# THE RUSSIAN ARMY

By

GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

It is, I think, a mistake to regard the army of Soviet Russia as something entirely new, born of revolution and owing no technical or spiritual connection with the army of the Tsars. For it is composed of the same material (except for the exclusive officer corps), must fight on much the same terrain, and is faced by similar strategical problems. Moreover there is much evidence that it clings to many of the old tactical ideas; for example, the Kiev maneuvers of 1935 were based on the principle of heavy attacks along the enemy's whole front, reducing local reserves to the minimum in order to obtain the strongest possible initial blow, while attempting at the same time to envelop one or both of his flanks. This is no new idea; it was incorporated in the Russian regulations in the '70's, owing largely to the views of General Dragomirov. It is in practice the direct antithesis of the methodical attacks which western officers consider are imposed on the assailant by the fire-power of modern weapons; and it is certainly a method which cannot safely be adopted by any army save one with an inexhaustible reserve of man power, an army which is nearly always certain of being superior in numbers. But this was the case with the Russian army in Dragomirov's day and is the case now; for it has a reservoir of 170,000,000 people to draw upon, more than twice that of Germany, four times that of France or England.

The Russian Army came to the turn of the century with a reputation second to none; a reputation born of two centuries of warfare, in which, though not always victorious, Russian troops had invariably borne themselves well, and a Russian military writer could boast that never yet had Russian soldiers

---

Major George Fielding Eliot, formerly of the Military Intelligence Reserve, U.S. Army, is co-author of *If War Comes*; and author of the forthcoming book, *The Ramparts We Watch*.

surrendered arms in hand. Beginning with the defeat of Charles XII at Poltava, the Russians had proved by far the most formidable foe of Frederick the Great; Suvorov's brilliant campaign in Italy had been the precursor to Eylau, where the great Napoleon was held to a drawn battle, and Friedland, where, though beaten, the Russian army took heavy toll for its defeat. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 was the beginning of his downfall. From the Crimean War, unable to save Sevastopol though it was, the Russian Army emerged with enhanced reputation for its fighting qualities. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 and the almost continuous warfare in the Caucasus and Central Asia of the last half of the century added to Russian laurels. "The Colossus of the North," when the century closed, was esteemed the mightiest military power of Europe. Yet within it was already at work the leaven of decay.

But four short years later, the almost legendary might of that colossus was brought low by the bitter struggle in Manchuria; the Japanese—given almost no chance to win by foreign observers at the opening of the conflict—proved more than a match for the Russians. The Russian soldier fought as heroically as ever; the fault lay higher up. The dry rot of favoritism and corruption; the venom of personal jealousies; the stagnation of ideas; the blighting hand of ultra-conservatism, in the Army as in all other departments of government and administration, striking down as "dangerous" anything that was new; all these had done their deadly work. The higher officers of the Army were imbued with cut-and-dried theories and ideas; "how fortunate," cried a corps commander, "that Vassilieff's division did not start an hour earlier! Had he done so he would have come upon the Japanese on the march, where we had no 'position'."

The defects were fundamental; they were not to be rectified by the surface reforms that followed the Russo-Japanese War. Ten years later, the Russian Army faced its greatest test all unready for the struggle. Personal jealousy was the greatest contributing factor in the defeat of Tannenberg; corruption in high places deprived troops of equipment, supplies, even of arms; palace intrigues undermined the one really capable com-

mander the Army had, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich; defeat in the field produced despair at home, and despair is the breeding ground of revolution.

So the Empire of the Tsars collapsed, for that empire was built upon the Army, and when its foundation could or would no longer support it, it was doomed. Out of the ruin arose a new state, a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and it is like the Tsarist state in this, that the Army gives it strong support. The difficulties in creating the Army of the new state were many, chief amongst them the lack of officers and of technical equipment. Those difficulties have not yet been wholly overcome, nor have the factors which brought about the downfall of the Imperial Army been wholly eliminated.

"Palace" intrigues still sweep away, periodically, generals and high staff officers; corruption, in one form or another, still occurs—they call it "sabotage" and "wrecking" today, and under those names doubtless masquerades also much that is really mere inefficiency; the distrust of new ideas is gone, but has been displaced by distrust of much that is foreign; and there has been superimposed upon the Army a political organization, the so-called "military commissars" who stand at the side of every commander, watching his actions, judging his conduct, reporting through a hierarchy of their own upon all that he does. "Not the slightest event," cries the *Krasnaia Zvezda*, organ of the Army, "can take place in the life of military units of which the commissar is not to be informed. . . . The commissar must cease to be a mere appendage of the commander with whom he serves and assume equal rights and authority with the commander. . . . The Communist Party will strike down anyone who attempts to weaken the political apparatus of the Red Army."

It may have been, in part, opposition to this system that ruined the able Marshal Tukhachevsky and eight of his associates in June, 1937. And just as the Great General Staff of the Kaiser heaved a mighty sigh of relief at the news of Liao-yang, Port Arthur and Mukden, so today the General Staff of Hitler's Wehrmacht is probably heaving another such sigh at the news of the re-introduction of the commissar system, which Tukhachevsky had all but destroyed. For, in the opinion of

military men, no army can function efficiently in war with divided command: let alone with a *system* of divided command which extends through every echelon from the highest to the lowest. It appears to us to be a system which puts a premium upon subservient mediocrity and destroys initiative and self-reliance.<sup>1</sup>

In numbers the Soviet Army has regained, and even surpassed, its strength of 1914. Then it was about 1,200,000 strong in time of peace; today that figure has risen to 1,300,000. Service is theoretically compulsory; men selected for color service remain with their units for 2, 3 or 4 years according to assignment, thereafter passing to the reserve. Theoretically these numbers could be at least doubled in war; actually it is very doubtful whether more than half a million men could be assembled and supplied in a single theater of operations anywhere on the western frontier, because of the inadequacy of the road and rail net to supply them.

As to equipment, there is plenty of light artillery, and armored cars and tanks; in the latter arm the Russians have made great advances. Of heavy and medium artillery there is a shortage. The infantry still carries for the most part the bolt-action magazine rifle with which the armies of 1914 were equipped, but then, so does the infantry of almost every other European army. There is a high proportion of light machine guns. In organization, there is a tendency to weight down the infantry with equipment; thus each infantry regiment has two batteries of artillery as an integral part of the unit, an arrangement which by no means allows the best results to be obtained from an arm whose flexibility of fire over wide ranges is one of its chief advantages. There is a higher proportion of horsed cavalry than in any other army save the Polish, and Cossack cavalry is reappearing. The tendency noted at recent maneuvers toward massed cavalry charges in terrain well-adapted to tanks is another indication of adherence to ancient ideas; tanks also are used en masse, and conversely there are far too few anti-tank guns.

1. A civilian interpretation of the system of political commissars in the Soviet army would emphasize the fact that the vast majority of officers in the Soviet army are members of the Communist Party and therefore are not likely to be antagonistic to the general ideas of the political commissars. It would also point to the importance of good relations between the army and the civilian population, which will be one of the concerns of the political commissars. [Ed.]

Detailed discussion of the Russian air force is outside the scope of this article; it can probably mobilize about 3,200 first line planes in Europe and 1,000 in the Far East, but these figures are approximations only. There is a civilian aviation organization which will provide a reserve of partially-trained personnel. Quality of material seems good; of personnel fair; tactical training and methods not yet up to French or British standards. The air force, like the Army, would suffer in war from the inadequacy of the industrial and transportation systems of the country to meet the tremendous strain of mobilization.

It is impossible to judge how far the Tukhachevsky "purge" and executions, and the numerous subsequent shifts among high-ranking officers have affected the morale and efficiency of the Red Army. The spirit of the men seems to continue high, their physical appearance impressive; but it would seem to a foreign observer that there cannot but have been some loss of confidence in the higher command and that the men cannot be expected to follow leaders at whose elbow stands ever watchful a political observer of the government, with the same whole-hearted devotion which the soldiers of the Tsar gave their officers in the days of Suvorov and Skobelev. But there is another side to the picture. The budget expenditure on political education and training is greater than that for military training; a fact which emphasizes the insistence of Soviet field service regulations on political operations by the Army within invaded territory in war. Propaganda is a weapon; and the political organization of the Red Army might in certain circumstances be as deadly a foe as its artillery.

However, under present conditions, there appears little likelihood of any invasion of Central or Western Europe by Russian troops. A recent German estimate gives the opinion that, in view of all the factors above recited, the Red Army could not operate effectively far outside the borders of Russia; on the other hand, in the defense of its own territory it would be a most formidable opponent.

This does not, however, apply—either in the judgment of the German officer concerned, or that of the writer—to the "Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army" of Marshal Vasili Galen-

Blücher. This force, some 400,000 strong, has been very little if at all affected by the Tukhachevsky affair, or later occurrences of like nature. The political commissar system is here perhaps more honored in the breach than the observance.<sup>2</sup> Thousands of miles from Moscow, commanded—apparently with a free hand—by the most capable of all Soviet generals, supported by growing local resources which render it daily more independent of European Russia, the Far Eastern Army is easily the most efficient and the most formidable military force at the command of the Soviet government. It is considered quite capable of offensive action if called upon; an opinion which is shared by the Japanese General Staff, if their policy of keeping their best troops on the Manchurian frontier and fighting the war in China with reservists is any criterion of their views.

In the recent border clash at Changkufeng the Far Eastern Army has apparently justified the high opinion of it held in foreign military circles; to which, again, the best testimony, in the presence of conflicting reports as to details of the fighting, is the Japanese diplomatic retreat which has followed. The world will follow with renewed interest the further developments of a situation which it would be foolish to regard as permanently stabilized.

---

2. Upon the request of the editor to enlarge on this point, Major Eliot replied: "I think you are right in suggesting that there is less friction in the Far Eastern Army because of Blücher's greater experience with the system of Commissars. He has apparently, been able to reduce it to a basis upon which there is no military interference; but I rather think it is because as a soldier he realizes its dangers and has taken steps to see to it that the authority of the commissar does not pass certain well-defined limits."



# THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF THE USSR

By

J. A. MORRISON

The structure of the Soviet form of government has been the subject of considerable study by European and American students of political science. The *areal* expression of that structure has received, however, but little attention. This is surprising in view of the increasing interest, both practical and theoretical, in the problem of the optimum size of administrative areas. It is believed that an understanding of the development of the Soviet territorial-administrative system to date, particularly as regards its non-national aspects, may prove of value to those interested in the *areal* aspects of government, as well as leading to a better understanding of the Soviet Union. The present article is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of Soviet regionizing, but rather an attempt to place before the reader the more important milestones in the evolution of the Soviet territorial-administrative structure.

To the geographer the most striking fact about this structure is its dynamic character. In no other country have there been so many and so extensive changes in internal boundaries. A map showing the administrative regions of the country is likely to be out of date as soon as it is published.<sup>1</sup> This dynamism together with the complex nature of the Soviet territorial-structure accounts for many of the disagreements in non-Soviet political-administrative maps of the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

1. Last September Dr. V. E. Motylev, the director of the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Atlas Mira*, was kind enough to give the writer an advance copy of the political-administrative map of the Soviet Union which was to be published in the *Atlas* due for distribution on the 20th Anniversary of the Revolution. Within two weeks more changes were made in the internal boundaries of the Union than in any similar period previously! Nevertheless, the *Atlas* appeared on schedule with the latest boundary changes shown.

2. This confusion is also in part due to the various translations of the Soviet territorial-administrative units, *krai*, *oblast*, *okrug*, and *rayon*. To avoid such confusion these terms will be retained in this article. To make these terms clearer to American readers, the *krais* and *oblasts* are large units roughly corresponding to states, while the *okrugs* are more nearly like counties and the *rayons* like townships.

John A. Morrison is an instructor in Geography at the University of Chicago. He attended the meeting of the International Geological Congress in Moscow in 1937.

The supra-national character of the Soviet state and its territorial organization on a national basis has been sufficiently indicated in numerous discussions of the Soviet handling of the nationality problem. It is thus only necessary to point out here that autonomy for the various nationalities inhabiting the Soviet Union constitutes the primary basis for the territorial-administrative division of the country and to characterize briefly this national division. There are at present four different grades of *national* territorial-administrative units, varying in the amount of autonomy which they possess from the eleven constituent, or Union, republics which theoretically have the right of secession, to the *national okrugs*, small areas forming national enclaves which enjoy autonomy to a very limited degree. As the nationality inhabiting a lower-grade national territorial-administrative unit becomes culturally and politically sufficiently advanced, its status is promoted to the next higher level of autonomy. Thus, the former Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz *autonomous soviet socialist republics* have been promoted to the rank of *constituent republic*, (the last two on the occasion of the adoption of the Constitution of 1936), while the former Komi, Udmurt (Votyak), Mari, Kalmyk, Kabardino-Balkar, North Ossetian, Chechen-Ingush, and Kara-Kalpak *autonomous oblasts* have been made *autonomous soviet socialist republics* (see Figures 2-4). But although there have been many changes in the rank of the national territorial-administrative units, the changes in their boundaries have been slight. The former exclaves of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR have been detached and organized as *national okrugs* within non-national territorial-administrative units, in the interests of greater administrative efficiency.<sup>3</sup> The former exclave of the Bashkir ASSR, which lay to the east of the main body of the republic, has been liquidated entirely. (Compare Figures 3 and 4) The boundaries of the vast, sparsely populated Yakut ASSR have undergone certain minor changes since its establishment: in 1931 its northwest corner (the Khatanga river district) was taken from the Yakut ASSR and joined to the newly formed East Siberian *Krai* (compare Figures 2 and 3), but it

3. This would appear to be a demotion in national status. However, as *national okrugs*, these areas have their own representation in the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR, whereas formerly they were represented by the delegates of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR. Thus, in one way, they have improved their status.

has since then been returned to the Yakut ASSR (Figure 4); since 1931 a band along its eastern frontier has been assigned to the Far Eastern *Krai* (compare Figures 3 and 4). A recent reduction in the territory of a national administrative area was the assignment of the northern tip of the Karelian ASSR (*Kandalaksha Rayon*) to the newly organized Murmansk *Oblast* in May of this year. Similar minor changes are to be expected in the future, but any major change would challenge a fundamental concept of the Soviet theory of government.

The secondary or *non-national* territorial-administrative structure is subject to no such restraint. Here the ruling consideration is administrative efficiency. Since all economy is state controlled and directed, the need for efficient administrative areas is more compelling than in countries where administration is more restricted in scope. With Soviet economy so markedly dynamic in character, it follows that an area which is of optimum size for administrative efficiency today is likely to be unwieldy tomorrow. Consequently, the tendency today, and for several years past, has been to break up the larger of these non-national administrative areas into smaller, more easily administered units. In the early years of the present regime, however, the tendency was in the opposite direction.


The territorial-administrative structure which the present regime inherited from the Russian Empire was poorly adapted to the requirements of the new socialist state (Figure 1). As a matter of fact, by the end of the last century it had become poorly adapted even to the needs of the Tsarist regime. Having developed from the territorial reforms of Peter the Great, it was essentially a product of the 18th century. As new territories were conquered and annexed to the Empire, they were organized into *guberniyas*, *oblasts*, and *general gubernatorstvos* on the pattern of the older part of the country, i.e., on the basis of the fiscal and military needs of the central government.<sup>4</sup> The rapid economic development of the last quarter of the 19th century gave rise to the same sort of administrative problems which developed in our own country, where state and county lines were likewise established before the areas concerned had

4. Jurij Semenow, "Die Revolution und die Inneren Grenzen Russlands," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, IV (1927), p. 971.

become developed. New cities and towns grew up which, in their economic relationships, were often more closely connected with the centers of other *guberniyas* than with their own. Industrial areas developed which overlapped the boundaries of two or more *guberniyas*. Administration became increasingly difficult. The maladjustment of the existing territorial-administrative structure to economic realities was recognized by many, and several schemes for re-regionizing the old Empire were suggested.<sup>5</sup> The early proposals contemplated new administrative areas which were to be "natural" regions, climatic, topographic, pedologic, botanical, or even geological, according to the special interest of the proposer. Later proposals added economic criteria. Since Russia was still largely an agricultural country, the first of these envisaged re-regionizing on the basis of agricultural similarities and differences. The "father of Russian geography," P. P. Semenov-Tian-Shansky in 1871 proposed dividing the country into 12 *rayons* based on similarities and differences of soils, precipitation, systems of agriculture, and stages of agricultural development. With the rise of industry other criteria were added. Thus, the chemist Mendeleyev proposed re-districting the country into 14 *rayons* based on the stage of development of industry and transport, and on fuel resources. The Tsarist government, however, rejected all proposals for recasting the territorial-administrative structure of the Empire, as smacking of revolutionary activity.

The new regime thus inherited a territorial-administrative system in little accord with the realities of the existing state of economic development. Being an economic as well as a political authority, the new government was almost immediately confronted with the necessity of re-aligning the territorial-administrative divisions of that part of the former Empire over which it exercised control. A number of changes were made shortly after the seizure of power, several new *guberniyas* being created (compare Figures 1 and 2). But these changes were part of no general plan, being designed to meet immediate local problems and needs. With the final liquidation of the counter-revolution and the firm establishment of the Soviet

5. *Ibid.*, p. 973-978.



Prepared by John A. Morrison

Figure 1. Territorial-Administrative Divisions of the Russian Empire, January 1, 1914

power, Lenin and his collaborators turned to the problems of planned economy. It is significant that the first comprehensive Soviet scheme for re-regionizing the country was an outgrowth of the first planning organization, the *Goelro*, or State Commission on the Electrification of the Republic which was formed, at Lenin's instigation, to draw up an electrification plan for the country. The *Goelro* outlined tentative "energy rays" as a base for the planned electrification. The *Goelro* was succeeded by a more comprehensive planning organization, the *Gosplan*, (State Planning Commission). One of the first tasks of the new planning board was the drawing up of a scheme for re-regionizing the country into economic rays as a basis for the future economic development of the country. In its report of April 13, 1922, to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, it outlined the basis for the proposed re-regionizing:

"The economic principle should underlie regionalization (*rayonirovanie*). As a regional unit we should delimit a territory of singular characteristics—if possible, one of economic unity—which, thanks to a combination of natural features, inherited cultural resources, and the degree of readiness of its population for economic production, would constitute a link in the whole chain of the national economic structure. The principle of economic unity gives us the opportunity for drawing up a plan for the economic development of a region based on a well-selected complex of local resources, capital values brought in from the outside, new techniques, and the national plan, which will provide the best possible use of all opportunities at the least possible cost. In the process there are involved other very important aims: regions are to specialize in those branches of economy which can be most fully developed in them, while exchange between regions will be strictly limited to the minimum necessary. Thus regionalization will permit the establishment of the closest liaison between the natural resources, customs, and existing capital structure of the region on the one hand, and the new techniques on the other, resulting in the optimum productive combination and a rational distribution of labor. It will also permit the integration of a region into a large-sized well-conditioned economic system, thus achieving patently best results."<sup>6</sup>

6. Quoted by G. N. Gurari in "K Voprosu ob Istorii Ekonomicheskogo Rayonirovaniya," *Voprosy Ekonomicheskoi Geografii* (V. F. Vasyutin and N. A. Kovalevsky, ed.), Moscow, Kommunisticheskaia Akademiya, Institut Ekonomiki, 1934, p. 167.



Applying the principles thus announced, the Gosplan outlined 21 economic *rayons* to serve as a blue-print for re-regionizing the country (Figure 3).

However, in a number of places this blue-print came into conflict with the earlier charted and already adopted division of the country on the basis of nationality. Thus, according to the Gosplan project, the Ukrainian SSR would have been divided between two *rayons*, one of which would have included a part of the RSFSR; the White Russian SSR would have become merely a part of the proposed Western *Rayon*; the Karelian ASSR a part of the proposed Northwestern *Rayon*, the Bashkir ASSR a part of the Ural *Rayon*; the Volga Tatars would have been divided between two of the proposed *rayons*, etc. In view of the prior claim of the principle of national autonomy, as a basis for the territorial division of the country, it was clear that the economic *rayons* of the Gosplan could only be realized as actual administrative regions where there was no major conflict with the nationality principle.

In addition to this very practical obstacle, there were certain fundamental theoretical objections to the establishment of administrative regions on the basis set forth by the Gosplan thesis quoted above. It will be noted that emphasis is laid upon delimiting regions possessed of environmental singularity. This would necessarily presuppose a fairly accurate knowledge of the environments of the entire country. While such knowledge might have been available for the older settled and better-known European portions of the country, for vast areas in Siberia and Central Asia sufficient data upon which to base a regional delimitation are not even now available, after a decade and a half of intensive scientific exploration and investigation. Moreover, even in the best-known parts of the country new mineral resources are frequently discovered, as for example, the great Kursk iron ore deposits, the magnitude of which was not realized until several years after the publication of the Gosplan project.<sup>7</sup>

7. This is obviously only one aspect of the general problem encountered in planning, where the resource complex is imperfectly known. One wonders if the great Ural-Kuzbas industrial combine would have been established in its present form if the full extent of the Karaganda coal basin had been realized at the time the plan was drawn up.

Another variable which the Gosplan failed to consider adequately is the effect of the possible discovery and development of new techniques for the utilization of known resources. It is obvious that an administrative region, established on the basis of existing techniques, might very well be far from optimum should new techniques be developed and applied.

Nevertheless, in spite of the practical and theoretical difficulties, a serious attempt was made to re-regionize the country along the lines of the Gosplan project, allowances being made for the prior claims of the more important nationalities. Between 1923 and 1930 the *guberniya* system, inherited from the old regime, disappeared completely, having already been greatly modified by the creation of the various national administrative areas. Wherever the nationality policy permitted, new large non-national territorial units called *oblasts* or *krais*<sup>8</sup> were organized, patterned as nearly as possible on the tentative economic *rayons* of the Gosplan project. The first of the new administrative areas to be established was the Ural *Oblast* which was organized toward the end of 1923. Figure 3 shows that it included several times the area in the proposed Gosplan *rayon*, taking in a large section of the West Siberian lowland. This was done in order to assure the industrial centers in the Urals a source of foodstuffs and lumber. In the following year the North Caucasian *Krai*, second of the new type of administrative area, was organized. It included parts of both the Caucasian and Southern Mining *Rayons* of the Gosplan project. To have established the former as a single new administrative region would have run counter to the desires of three important minorities, the Georgians, Azerbaidzhan Turks, and Armenians, important because of their recent history and frontier position. The inclusion in the new *Krai* of a part of Gosplan's Southern Mining *Rayon* also resulted from the superior weight of the nationality policy as a basis for territorial division. Under the Gosplan project the entire Donets mining and in-

---

8. The *krai* differs from the *oblast* only in including within its boundaries one or more autonomous soviet socialist republics or autonomous *oblasts*. For a time there were two categories of autonomous soviet socialist republics, those directly under the constituent republic in which they were located, and those, generally the less important ones, included within the *krais*. Under the Constitution of 1936, the few autonomous soviet socialist republics remaining within *krais* were placed directly under the appropriate constituent republic. At the present time, therefore, a *krai* includes only autonomous *oblasts*.





Figure 2. Territorial-Administrative Divisions of the USSR, September 15, 1926

dustrial region would have been organized into a single administrative region. But the fact that the western part of this region was predominantly Ukrainian in population and the eastern part Russian made this impossible. Hence the Russian part was organized into the new *Krai*, bringing to it a leaven of industrial workers to balance the otherwise predominantly agricultural character of the population. In 1925, the huge Siberian *Krai* was organized, taking in all of the Gosplan's Yenisei and Kuznetsk-Altai *Rayons*, most of the Lena-Baikal *Rayon*, and a part of the Ob *Rayon*. The Far Eastern *Krai*, on the other hand, organized in the next year, followed the Gosplan Far Eastern *Rayon* rather closely.

In the older European part of the Union several of the new administrative regions corresponded fairly closely to the *Rayons* outlined by Gosplan. Thus the Northern *Krai*, established in 1929, and the Central Black Earth *Oblast*, organized the previous year, approximated the Northern and Central Black Earth *Rayons* of Gosplan. In the case of the former, a non-Russian nationality, the Komi, was involved, but it was not sufficiently advanced to require autonomous status outside the new *krai-oblast* structure. The Lower Volga *Krai*, organized in 1928, and the Nizhegorod *Krai*, formed the next year, followed somewhat less closely the Gosplan Lower Volga and Vyatka-Vetluga *Rayons*. Like the Northern *Krai*, they took in minor national administrative areas: the Lower Volga *Krai* included the Volga German ASSR and the Kalmyk Autonomous *Oblast*; while the Mari and Udmurt (Votyak) Autonomous *Oblasts* and the Chuvash ASSR were included in the Nizhegorod *Krai*.

In the Northwestern and Western *Rayons* of Gosplan, important minorities were involved: in the case of the former, the Karelians, numerically not very important, but significant because of their frontier position and their ethnic relation to the Finns on the other side of the international frontier; and in the case of the latter, the White Russians, numerically important and occupying a very strategic frontier position. Hence, the Leningrad *Oblast*, organized in 1927, was approximately the Northwestern *Rayon* minus the Karelian ASSR, while the Western *Oblast* consisted of the Western *Rayon* of Gosplan less the White Russian SSR.



Prepared by John A. Morrison

Figure 3. Territorial-Administrative Divisions of the USSR, January 1, 1951

The Middle Volga *Krai* also departed considerably from the Gosplan Middle Volga *Rayon* because of the important Tatar minority inhabiting the northern part of that *rayon* and because of the necessity for taking in the narrow strip of Russian territory between the Bashkir ASSR and the Kazakh ASSR.

The failure to organize the Central Industrial *Rayon* of Gosplan into a single administrative region was not due, however, to any ethnic consideration, since the population in this region was almost exclusively Russian. Furthermore, being the best known part of the country, the proposed *rayon* probably came closer to the Gosplan definition than did any of the others. Nevertheless, the projected *rayon* was organized, in 1929, into two of the new *oblasts*, Moscow and Ivanovo Industrial. The explanation of this apparent direct violation of the fundamental principles of regionizing, as set forth by Gosplan, lies in the domain of administrative efficiency. Had the proposed *rayon* been established as an actual administrative area, it would have had a population of over 16 million, including the capital and largest city of the country, and a large share of the country's factory industry. The bureaucracy necessary to control and direct the activities of so many people and industries would have been unwieldy, since the various governmental organs could not have maintained sufficiently close contact with the enterprises and areas for which they would have been responsible. The formation of the Moscow and Ivanovo Industrial *Oblasts* may be regarded as signaling the beginning of a new trend, under which administrative efficiency counted more in the determination of administrative areas than did the realization of so-called economic regions.

Under the enormous increase in the activities of government during the first Five-Year Plan, due partly to the great expansion of industry, but also to the increasing share of the socialized sector in the economic life of the country, the new administrative areas established between 1923 and 1929 proved to be too large for efficient administration. The first of these regions to be split up was the huge Siberian *Krai*: in 1930 it was divided into the West and East Siberian *Krais*, with the latter taking over the Trans-Baikal *Okrug* of the Far Eastern *Krai*. Mining and industrial developments in the Kuznetsk

Basin were reasons given for the division, but it seems likely that such a huge administrative area proved inefficient from its inception. By the end of 1931, it was found expedient to organize the Kazakh ASSR into *oblasts*, six being organized at first: West Kazakhstan, Aktyubinsk, Karaganda, East Kazakhstan, Alma Ata, and South Kazakhstan. Hitherto, *oblasts* had been organized only in the RSFSR. Early in 1932, the Ukrainian SSR was likewise divided into *oblasts*: Kharkov, Kiev, Vinnytsa, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Chernigov, and Donetsk. In both Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, the new *oblasts* were considerably smaller than the earlier ones formed in the RSFSR. It was not until 1934, that the *oblasts* and *krais* established earlier in the RSFSR had become so inefficient that a further re-regionizing was found imperative. During that year and the early part of 1935 most of the *oblasts* and *krais* formed in the period 1922-1929 were split up into smaller units. In January, 1934, the Ural Oblast was divided into the Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Ob-Irtysh Oblasts.<sup>9</sup> It was followed by the division of the North Caucasian Krai into the Azov-Black Sea and North Caucasian Krai.<sup>10</sup> At the same time the Lower Volga Krai was divided into the new Saratov and Stalingrad Krai, the former including the Volga German ASSR, and the latter the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast.<sup>11</sup> In July, the Central Black Earth Oblast was divided into the Kursk and Voronezh Oblasts. At the end of the year the eastern part of the long and narrow Middle Volga Krai was detached to form the new Orenburg Oblast, the remainder retaining the former name.<sup>12</sup> At the same time the Gorky (formerly Nizhegorod) Krai was divided: the northeastern part, including the Udmurt (Votyak) ASSR, together with some districts on the western edge of the Sverdlovsk Oblast became the new Kirov Krai; the remaining part of the former Gorky Krai, with the Chuvash ASSR and the

9. At the end of the year the western part of the West Siberian Krai with the important city of Omsk and the eastern part of the Chelyabinsk Oblast were added to the territory of the Ob-Irtysh Oblast, and the whole was renamed the Omsk Oblast.

10. The North Caucasian Krai was subsequently renamed Ordzhonikidze Krai.

11. Under the Constitution of 1936, the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast was promoted to the rank of autonomous soviet socialist republic. At the same time it was placed, along with the Volga German ASSR, directly under the jurisdiction of the RSFSR, and the Saratov and Stalingrad Krai thus became *oblasts*.

12. Subsequently renamed Kuibyshev Krai. With the placing of the Mordvin ASSR directly under the RSFSR, the region became an *oblast*.



Mari Autonomous *Oblast*, retained the old name.<sup>13</sup> Also, at this time, the Krasnoyarsk *Krai* was formed out of the western and northern parts of the East Siberian *Krai*, and a portion of the West Siberian *Krai*, including the Khakass Autonomous *Oblast*. Early in 1935 the Kalinin *Oblast* was formed out of the northern parts of the Moscow and Western *Oblasts* and certain districts along the southern border of the Leningrad *Oblast*. Shortly afterwards, the northern half of the Ivanovo Industrial *Oblast* was detached to form the new Yaroslav *Oblast*, the remaining southern half forming the new Ivanovo *Oblast*.

The listing of the territorial-administrative divisions of the Union in the Constitution of 1936 suggested that the process of creating new administrative areas had come to an end. In his discussion of proposed amendments to the draft of the Constitution, before the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets, Stalin confirmed this impression:

"It is further proposed to strike out the detailed enumeration of the administrative divisions of our Union republics into *krais* and *oblasts* in Sections 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. I think that this proposal is likewise inadmissible. There are people in the USSR who are eagerly and indefatigably disposed to rehash the *krais* and *oblasts*, bringing obscurity and confusion to the work. The draft constitution creates a bridle for these people. And this is desirable, because here, as in many other places, we need an atmosphere of certainty, stability, clarity."<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless, in September, 1937, a whole series of new administrative divisions was announced. On the 13th, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR announced the splitting up of the Azov-Black Sea *Krai* into the Rostov-on-Don *Oblast* and the Krasnodar *Krai*. A week later the Kharkov *Oblast* of the Ukrainian SSR was divided into the Poltava and Kiev *Oblasts*, and the Odessa *Oblast* into the Odessa and Nikolayev *Oblasts*. The following day, the 23rd, the Central Executive Committee announced the division of the Northern *Oblast*,<sup>15</sup> the only one of the *oblasts* or *krais* in the European part of the RSFSR

13. Under the new Constitution, the Mari Autonomous *Oblast* was made an autonomous soviet socialist republic and, together with the Udmurt and Chuvash republics, placed directly under the RSFSR. The Kirov and Gorky *Krais* thus became *oblasts*.

14. Quoted in *Administrativno-territorialnoe Delenie Soyuznykh Respublik na 1 Marta 1937 g.*, publ. by the Tsentralny Iсполnitelny Komitet SSSR, Moscow, 1937, vi.

15. The new Constitution had promoted the Komi Autonomous *Oblast*, formerly a part of the Northern *Krai*, to the rank of autonomous soviet socialist republic, thus changing the status of the Northern region from *krai* to *oblast*.



which had not yet been divided, into the Arkhangelsk and Vologda *Oblasts*. The latter also received a strip of territory from the Leningrad *Oblast*.

The 26th was a red-letter day. On that date the Central Executive Committee confirmed the formation of the Tula *Oblast* from the southern part of the Moscow *Oblast*; the Ryazan *Oblast* out of parts of the Voronezh and Moscow *Oblasts*; the Chita *Oblast* out of the Zeya *Oblast* of the Far Eastern *Krai* and the trans-Baikal part of the East Siberian *Oblast*,<sup>16</sup> and the Irkutsk *Oblast* out of the part of the East Siberian *Oblast* to the west of Lake Baikal. On the 27th there were almost as many changes: announcement was made of the formation of the Tambov *Oblast* out of parts of the Voronezh and Kuibyshev *Oblasts*; the Orel (Orlovskaya) *Oblast* from parts of the Kursk, Voronezh, and Western *Oblasts*; and the Smolensk *Oblast* out of the remaining part of the former Western *Oblast*. This spasm of re-regionizing came to an end on the following day with the announcement of the division of the West Siberian *Krai* into the Novosibirsk *Oblast* and the Altai *Krai*. Since last September only two new *oblasts* have been created: the Murmansk *Oblast* from the Murmansk *Okrug* of the Leningrad *Oblast* and the northern tip of the Karelian ASSR (Kandalaksha *Rayon*) in May; and the Voroshilovgrad *Oblast* out of the eastern part of the Stalin (formerly Donets) *Oblast* in the Ukrainian SSR.


A comparison of the present *krais* and *oblasts* (Figure 4) with the economic *rayons* proposed by the Gosplan (Figure 3) shows how completely the latter have been abandoned as a basis for the non-national territorial-administrative division of the country. This rejection of supposed economic-geographic regions as the basis for territorial-administrative boundaries, in favor of administrative areas based on the practical requirements of administration is evidence of the trend toward realism which appears to have characterized Soviet policies in recent years.<sup>17</sup>

16. The new Constitution had taken the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR out of the East Siberian *Krai* and placed it directly under the RSFSR, thus changing the status of the East Siberian *Krai* to *oblast*.

17. It seems to be characteristic of regionalists, not only in the U.S.S.R., but also in other countries, that, in their enthusiasm for delimiting regions, they lose sight of the essential truism that administrative areas exist for purposes of administration, and that any changes in the areas should therefore be made with the object of improving administration.



Figure 4. Territorial-Administrative Divisions of the USSR



Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

- 23 Ust-Ordynsk Buryat-Mongolian National *okrug*  
 24 Aginsk Buryat-Mong. Nat. *okrug*  
 Georgian S.S.R.  
 25 Abkhazian A.S.S.R.  
 26 Adzharian A.S.S.R.  
 27 South Ossetian Aut. *oblast*  
 Azerbaidzhan S.S.R.  
 28 Nakhichevan A.S.S.R.  
 29 Nagorny Karabakh Aut. *obl.*

### Boundary Symbols

- International  
 Constituent Republic  
 Autonomous Republic  
 Autonomous *oblast*  
 National *okrug*  
 Krai or *oblast*  
*Oblast* in Far Eastern Krai

Prepared by John A. Morrison

ions of the USSR, June 1, 1938

The foregoing shows that the trend for several years has been in the direction of reducing the size of the territorial-administrative units.<sup>18</sup> At the present time the size of the *oblasts* and *krais* approximates the size of the old *guberniyas* (Compare Figures 5 and 8). With economic life continuing to develop and expand, it seems probable that the process of splitting up the *krais* and *oblasts* may continue further. It is possible that the process will continue to the point where some new administrative unit, grouping several *oblasts*, will have to be introduced in order to provide a measure of reintegration.

It might seem that the likelihood of further changes in the boundaries of *oblasts* and *krais* would make for difficulties in planning. However, the fundamental *areal* planning unit is the *rayon* (not to be confused with the much larger economic *rayons* proposed by Gosplan), and these smaller units are rarely divided.<sup>19</sup> This brings us to a consideration of the changes in the minor territorial-administrative divisions.

The pre-revolutionary *guberniyas* were divided into *uezds*, and the *oblasts* into *okrugs*; both in turn being further divided into *volosts*, and the latter into *selos* (villages) and *derevnyas* (hamlets). These minor divisions, along with the *guberniyas*, were continued for several years after the establishment of the Soviet power, except that the smallest units were replaced by a new unit, the *selsoviet*, or its equivalent. In 1923, the *rayon*, midway in size between the *volost* and the *uezd*, was introduced. As the new *oblasts* and *krais* were formed, the *volosts* and *uezds* were liquidated and the *rayon* made the territorial-administrative division between the *oblast* or *krai* and the *selsoviet*. The *okrug*, which was a division of the old *oblast*, was introduced in some of the larger new *oblasts* and *krais*

18. The only exception to this trend has been in the case of the Far Eastern *Krai*, where, because of the sparse population and the lack of centers easily accessible from Moscow, a division into separate *krais* and *oblasts* was not expedient. However, the remoteness and inaccessibility of many of the individual *rayons*, as well as their strategic importance, required some kind of regional grouping. Thus, toward the end of 1932, some of the more remote *rayons* were organized into *oblasts* within the *krai*. This system was extended in 1934, so that at present the Far Eastern *Krai* is composed of seven non-national *oblasts* and one autonomous *oblast* (Jewish). Instead of having to maintain touch with the centers of 64 *rayons*, the *krai* center has to deal with seven easily accessible *oblast* centers. With improvement in the means of communication and transportation and an increase in the density of population, it seems probable that certain of these *oblasts* will be taken out of the *krai* framework and placed directly under Moscow. (Alexander Rado, "Der Neueste Stand der Politisch-Geographischen Einteilung der Sowjet-Union," *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen*, 1935, p. 15.)

19. Administratively, changes in the large units, *krais* and *oblasts*, are somewhat similar in effect to multiplying the number of state governments in this country, while leaving the county and township set-up as it is.

where distance or difficulty of communication between the *oblast* or *krai* centers and the *rayon* centers made an intermediate link advisable. Thus, the *rayons* of the Kola Peninsula, a part of the Leningrad *oblast* separated from the main body of the *oblast* by the Karelian ASSR, were grouped together in the Murmansk *okrug*. In the Ukraine, on the other hand, the *okrug* was for a time the largest territorial-administrative division. The 625 *rayons* into which the republic was divided, on the abolition of the old *guberniyas*, were grouped into 40 *okrugs*. With the creation of new and smaller *oblasts* and with the improvement of transportation and communication between the *oblast* and *rayon* centers, the need for *okrugs* is gradually disappearing.<sup>20</sup> Within a short time the non-national territorial-administrative structure will thus be simplified. Likewise, as autonomous *oblasts* are promoted to autonomous soviet socialist republics, the few remaining *krais* will become *oblasts*.

In conclusion, a few words should be added regarding the mechanics of establishing new administrative regions. The form of the public announcement of changes might suggest that the decisions to create new units are taken in Moscow without regard to local desires and without opportunities for full discussion.<sup>21</sup> This is not the case, however. The initiative for the formation of a new administrative area may come from the area concerned, from the government of the republic, or from the Gosplan in Moscow. If the local authorities feel that in the administration of the *oblast* or *krai* they are being unduly neglected and that the creation of a new *oblast* or *krai* would correct the abuse, they may so suggest to the appropriate republican authorities. Or the *oblast* and *krai* authorities, realiz-

20. Reference here is to the *non-national okrug*, not to be confused with the *national okrug*, the lowest grade of national territorial-administrative unit.

21. As an example of such an announcement, that concerning the division of the West Siberian *Krai* into the Novosibirsk *Oblast* and Altai *Krai* which appeared in *Izvestia* of Sept. 29, 1937, might be taken:

"The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decrees the confirmation of the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee:

- a) To divide the West Siberian *Krai* into the Novosibirsk *Oblast* with center at Novosibirsk and the Altai *Krai* with center at Barnaul.
- b) To place in the Altai *Krai* the Oirot Autonomous *Oblast* and the following cities and *rayons*:  
(List follows)
- c) The remaining cities and *rayons* of the former West Siberian *Krai* to form the Novosibirsk *Oblast*.

President of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR  
M. Kalinin  
Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR  
A. Gorkin"

# TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS



Figure 5. January 1, 1914




Figure 6. January 1, 1931

OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN RUSSIA



Figure 7. September 1, 1937




Figure 8. October 1, 1937

ing that it is impossible to administer the existing *oblast* or *krai* efficiently, may propose a division. In most cases the suggestion originates from one of these two sources. If, however, the production figures for a given *oblast* fall seriously behind the quarterly plan, and no recommendations have been made from the local or regional authorities, the *regional section* of the Gosplan may send a "trouble-shooter" to investigate. If his findings show that the lag is wholly or in part due to the inefficient size of the administrative area, he may recommend to the republican authorities, after discussions with the local authorities, that the area be divided into units more easily able to be administered. In any case, the decree authorizing the change is issued by the Central Executive Committee of the republic concerned and confirmed by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.<sup>22</sup>

With all economy under the direction of the government it is of the utmost importance that administrative areas be quickly adapted to the requirements of a dynamic economy. The peculiar structure of the Soviet form of government insures that such changes can be made as needed.

(The maps contained in this article are copyrighted. Additional copies may be obtained through The American Russian Institute for 5c. a piece or 25c. a set.)

---

22. Under the 1936 Constitution, this function is taken over by the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, subject to ratification by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.



# THE EVOLUTION OF FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS

By

ALBERT PARRY

Among the central facts of the present-day balance of power in Europe, not the least place is occupied by the Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance. If and when a war comes as a result of aggression on the part of a third state against either France or the USSR, the armies of the two states will fight together. In December, 1916, arguing that true revolutionaries could not support any of the states then at war, Lenin made no exception for France: "This war is waged not by a democratic and revolutionary France, not by the France of 1792, the France of 1848, the France of the Commune. This war is waged by a bourgeois France, a reactionary France, an ally and friend of Tsarism."<sup>1</sup> What change has come to pass since 1916? Has France grown more revolutionary, or the Bolshevik party less revolutionary?

The answer to these questions may be read in the editorial published in the Moscow *Izvestia* ten days after the pact of 1935 was signed: "The French Republic does not base its action (in signing the pact) on the same premises of principle as does the Soviet Union. But no one who knows the world-situation can accuse France of aiming now at new conquests or of being now interested in unleashing the forces of war." Both countries, for somewhat different reasons, are imbued with the same aim: preservation of peace, "joint defense in the event of danger." Essentially, there is nothing new in the Moscow policy: "In this struggle for peace and in the struggle against any aggressor, the Soviet Republic, from the very first days of its existence, was ready to come to an agreement with any power which was ready to act against the danger of war

1. V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XXX (Moscow: Partinoe Izdatel'stvo, 1932), p. 285.

Albert Parry is a writer, specializing on Russian foreign relations. His Ph.D. thesis for the University of Chicago, completed in 1938, is on "Greek Orthodox (Russian) Missionaries in China, 1689-1917: Their Political, Economic and Cultural Role."

and against those responsible for this danger."<sup>2</sup> A varying path to such co-operation must then be traced largely on the French side of the pact.

1

It is, indeed, a long trail from that day of January 21, 1919, when the French premier Clemenceau declared: "I am not favorable to holding conversations with the Bolsheviks, as I consider them criminals."<sup>3</sup>

What was their crime? The leading rightist dailies of Paris may have thundered against the terrors of the Cheka, the suppression of civil liberties by the Moscow government, its anti-church policy, and many other transgressions, but actually, to most of those Frenchmen in whose behalf the press and Clemenceau spoke, the main crime was the repudiation of Tsarist debts and nationalization of private property. With the coming of the Bolsheviks to power, dividends ceased to flow from the Russian banks to the French bond- and share- holders, and the principal itself was threatened with complete loss.

Military intervention and a *cordon sanitaire*, virtually a blockade, were the only two methods Clemenceau and his foreign minister Pichon favored as answers to Russia's problem. But the growing unrest in the Allied countries and the high cost of sending troops to Russia, plus President Wilson's idealism, gave birth to the famous project of the Prinkipo conference. On the islands near Constantinople, representatives of all the warring Russian factions were to meet to settle their differences under the direction of the Entente and the United States. The project was still-born, for Clemenceau and other conservative statesmen, while paying lip-service to Wilson's scheme, wrecked it and blamed the wreck on the Soviets. Even Wilson was enticed into adding his signature to Clemenceau's despatch to Kolchak, in which Moscow was blamed: "This proposal [of Prinkipo] . . . broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while negotiations or the work of relief

2. "Franco-Soviet Relations and the Visit of Mr. Pierre Laval," *Izvestia*, May 12, 1935. Here quoted from Samuel N. Harper (ed.), *The Soviet Union and World-Problems* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935), p. 212.

3. Charles T. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (New York: Brentano's, 1920), p. 131. The author was the Associated Press correspondent at the Conference.

was proceeding.”<sup>4</sup> So well did Clemenceau succeed that even in historical literature on the subject not a few authorities have asserted erroneously that “the Prinkipo proposal was flouted by the Bolsheviks”<sup>5</sup> and “the Bolsheviks had refused to enter the Prinkipo conference.”<sup>6</sup>

As revealed in less-known documents of that time, the real story of the failure of the Prinkipo project was as follows. To begin with, the invitation to the Soviet government “was simply never sent for reasons which the French wireless authorities or their superiors have failed to explain,” and Moscow learned of the proposal “through wireless press messages picked up by its receiving stations.”<sup>7</sup> According to Chicherin, who then headed the Soviet foreign office, he had to reply to an unaddressed invitation sent out from Paris by radio, asking all the *de facto* governments of Russia to come to Prinkipo.<sup>8</sup> A British writer added the enlightening information that only “the invitation to Moscow was unsigned and bore no indication of its official origin.”<sup>9</sup>

When, on February 4, the Soviet government sent its official reply, it was to the invitation it had not officially received. The reply stated that, despite the constant improvement of its war fortunes and domestic affairs, the Soviet government sincerely desired peace and was therefore willing to pay foreign debts in cases where creditors were subjects of the Entente powers; to send raw materials abroad as guarantee of “the payment of interest on its loans”; and to grant mining, logging, and other concessions to subjects of the Entente powers.<sup>10</sup> In March, 1919, when Bullitt spent a week in Russia, Lenin jotted down the Soviet terms of peace to be taken to Paris, including the

4. Paris Peace Conference to Admiral Kolchak, May 26, 1919, in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia* (Washington: The Department of State, 1937), p. 368.

5. A. L. Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy and New, 1876-1922, from Salisbury to Lloyd George* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1923), p. 306.

6. Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), p. 347.

7. H. Wilson Harris, *The Peace in the Making* (London: The Swarthmore Press, 1919), p. 133.

8. George Chicherin, *Two Years of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Russian Soviet Gov't Bureau, Soviet Russia Pamphlets, No. 3, 1920), p. 30.

9. Sisley Huddleston, *Peace Making at Paris* (London: T. Fisher Ltd., 1919), p. 55.

10. For the full text of the note see C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit (eds.), *Russian-American Relations, March, 1917-March, 1920; Documents and Papers* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), pp. 298-303; for a brief summary, Chicherin, *op. cit.* p. 30.

following variation of Moscow's readiness to settle the old debts: All the governments in Russia and Finland should recognize their responsibility "for the financial obligations of the former empire, to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states."<sup>11</sup>

Here was a fertile basis for a speedy ending of the civil war. And yet peace did not come. No doubt following Clemenceau's orders, Pichon did "everything that could be done . . . to induce all the other groups, save the Bolsheviks, to decline to go to Prinkipo," in pursuance of the Tiger's policy "of acquiescing in public but of opposing in private."<sup>12</sup> According to Bullitt's testimony, the Quai d'Orsay

communicated to the Ukrainian government and various other anti-Soviet governments that if they were to refuse the proposal, they [the French] would support them and continue to support them, and not allow the Allies, if they could prevent it, or the allied governments, to make peace with the Russian Soviet government.<sup>13</sup>

The refusal was reported and applauded in the press of Paris where, with a most open encouragement of the French foreign office, an anti-Soviet campaign now reached unprecedented proportions.<sup>14</sup>

Why did the French torpedo Wilson's proposal?

Because they did not want the freezing of the unnatural *status quo* in Russia, because they desired Russia not as a series of "balkanized" states but as a strong united empire and thus a potential threat to Germany from the East. Through the continuation of the civil war and intervention they thought that this could be accomplished.

Uppermost, however, was the question of money. Colonel House rightly felt that "much of the French opposition to making peace with the Soviet government was on account of the money owed by Russia to France."<sup>15</sup> Moscow promised to

11. *The Bullitt Mission to Russia; Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, of William C. Bullitt* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919), pp. 39-44. Cf. *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, May 22, 1919, and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia*, op. cit. p. 80.

12. Huddleston, op. cit. p. 54.

13. *The Bullitt Mission*, op. cit. p. 32.

14. George Bernard Noble, *Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), chap. viii, "The Enigma of Russia."

15. *The Bullitt Mission*, op. cit. p. 35.

pay her share of Tsarist debts; this would indeed satisfy the French bondholders. But Moscow would not return nationalized property; this hit the pockets of the few but powerful industrialists. The French government seemed ready to sacrifice the interests of the many small bondholders to the demands of those few.

Those few—the French plutocracy and their government—feared the very presence of a Soviet regime: confined to no matter how small a territory in Central Russia, it was a threat on an international scale, a threat to their wealth and power at home. They hoped to exterminate the bacillus of the dangerous idea through aiding the White armies with money and arms, if not troops. A minor success of Kolchak's, reported with much exaggeration in that spring of 1919, seemed to prop up the hope at a most strategic moment. The intervention went on.

## II

The motives and methods of Clemenceau and Pichon were, with certain variations, to repeat themselves in the French policy toward the Soviet republic for more than a decade. Indeed, they have not entirely disappeared even in these days of rapprochement between the two countries, but are used by those interests in France that would undo the pact of 1935 and all it represents.

In 1922, Poincaré's insistence on Moscow's unconditional restitution of nationalized property caused failure of the conferences at Genoa and the Hague. During those conferences Chicherin and Litvinov repeated their government's readiness to negotiate on the question of pre-war debts. Against this, the bill for the damages caused by the intervention was impressive. Still, Moscow was willing to pay a certain portion of the Tsarist debts—provided that France and other powers granted credits to the young republic, with which it would reconstruct its crippled economy. It would be out of the profits of such reconstruction that the old debts would be paid—rather, the old debts in the French opinion, and but extra interests on credits in the Soviet way of looking at things. Returning private property would go against the most fundamental principle of the Russian revolution. The British seemed to agree with such

reasoning; they favored long-term leases to former owners, and even nodded to the Soviet counter-offer of concessions on some of the properties. The French, however, insisted on unconditional restitution, and in time won the British over. They were helped by the behind-the-scenes encouragement on the part of the Harding administration in Washington and also by the fact that in British politics the conservatives were just then coming to the forefront.

The main reason, as in 1919, was the desire of the French authorities to save the stake of those with direct investments in Russia rather than the *rents* of the smaller bourgeoisie and the peasants. There was also the fact that French capital in the post-war period was not in a position to extend credits to, or take up concessions in, Russia. Rather than to see the English in possession of the new plums, Poincaré would prevent an agreement with the Soviets. It is also possible that at Genoa and the Hague he "fought a settlement with Russia partly out of fear that it would stabilize European politics and prevent French occupation of the Ruhr."<sup>16</sup> He may have needed a strong Russia but not a strong Red Russia; he knew that his France could not hope to enter into secret agreements with her against Germany or any other power. Besides, at the other end of Germany there was now Poland; not as large a country as Russia, to be sure, she was nonetheless strong for his purposes, and willing to play at undercover diplomacy with the Quai d'Orsay. Too, Germany was defeated and disarmed, and at her eastern fringe no greater check was needed than Pilsudski.

### III

Even after the French elections of 1924 brought to power such pacifists as Herriot, it was in reality a part-way power, especially in foreign affairs. Whether in or outside the office, Poincaré continued to wield the wand, now boldly, now slyly. The Soviet republic was at last recognized, but only after Mussolini's Italy and MacDonald's England had led the way. At once the new Soviet embassy was depicted by the rightist press as a center of plotting by French communists. Denying the charges, the Soviets in their turn said that Paris, as before

16. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), p. 369.

recognition, harbored the most rampant White Russian intrigue; that Herbette, the first French Ambassador in Moscow, protected a compatriot who violated Soviet laws by representing the Vatican's interests in Russia. Testimony of the accused engineers in the Shakhty trial in 1928 charged the French secret service with organizing and aiding anti-Soviet conspirators in the Don coal industry. In the trial of the Industrial Party of 1930, Ramzin and other defendants confessed that in their treason they were directed by French officials and generals who, according to this testimony, were preparing another intervention. Poincaré and Briand made emphatic denials of such charges. Distrust and bad blood ruled the day.

The renewed debt-and-credit negotiations had by the close of the decade come to a total impasse. In the entire decade there was but one bright, albeit brief, period—from December, 1925, to July, 1926—when Franco-Soviet relations seemed to augur well and the financial negotiations appeared at last to reach their successful end. But after Herriot, de Monzie, and Briand did their best (or, in the case of Briand, second-best) to come to a settlement with the Soviets, Poincaré chose to use his influence to bog the negotiations within, as it were, five minutes of final signature. What was the Soviet stand on the matter at this time?

On November 5, 1927, in reply to a question from the foreign worker delegates to the celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Revolution, Stalin summed up the Soviet position of give-and-take, thus addressing the France of Poincaré:

If you give us credits, you will receive something from us on account of the pre-war debts, if you do not give anything you will not receive anything. Does this mean that we have thereby recognized in principle the pre-war debts? Certainly not. It means only that while leaving in force the well-known decree about the annulment of old Tsarist debts, we are prepared at the same time, in the form of a practical agreement, to pay a part of the pre-war debts if we get in return the credits which we need, and which will at the same time be useful to French industry. We look upon payments on account of the pre-war debts as additional interest on the credits which we will receive for the development of our industry.<sup>17</sup>

17. Joseph Stalin, *Leninism* (Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1934), I, 417.

The final draft of an agreement worked out by Rakovsky, Soviet Ambassador in France, and de Monzie, heading the French negotiators—the draft suspended by Poincaré and never put into effect—called for 42 annuities of \$12,000,000 each to be paid by Russia to France as the settlement of old debts, and in return the French were to grant credits amounting to \$120,000,000 in six annual installments. The debt settlement represented about one-quarter of the original French claims; "in days of debt cancellation and inflation many people thought that this was not a completely unsatisfactory solution of the Russian debt question."<sup>18</sup>

But again nothing was said or settled with regard to private property, and this omission once more served as the rock upon which Poincaré wrecked the settlement. His ill-will was seconded and aided not only by the British conservatives, then in a phase of acute anti-Soviet jitters, but—according to the testimony in the Moscow trial of March 2-13, 1938—also by Rakovsky. From his place in the dock he declared: "In 1924, I established criminal connections with the British Intelligence Service. . . . In 1927, I carried on negotiations with some of the Right capitalist circles in France, the object of these negotiations being in the long run directed against the Soviet Union."<sup>19</sup> Under these circumstances, the campaign of the reactionary newspapers for Rakovsky's recall from Paris, and the subsequent foundering of the financial settlement, may have been prepared not without his assent or even personal direction. His own testimony leads to the conclusion that Rakovsky, no less than Poincaré, may have represented the interests opposed to settlement of the Soviet-French dispute.

#### IV

Meantime, even before the first Five-Year Plan, and certainly during it, the industrialists of the United States, England, and Germany were obtaining considerable Soviet orders for machinery. France, by the very nature of her luxury-article in-

18. John B. Wolf, "The USSR: France's Dilemma," *World Affairs*, Washington, June, 1938, p. 83.

19. *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet 'Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites' Heard Before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Moscow, March 2-13, 1938* (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice, 1938), p. 759.



dustry, had a lesser chance in the Russian markets; by the obstructionist actions of her anti-Soviet elements she was diminishing her opportunities yet further.

Concurrently, word was increasingly brought into France of the fast improvement in the armed forces of the USSR; yet, instead of viewing the Red army as a potential ally in the preservation of the world peace, Briand used Moscow's betterment of defense as an excuse to speak at Geneva against the Soviet proposals of general disarmament. Litvinov meant France when on December 10, 1928, he remarked:

By our proposals of pacts of non-aggression and disarmament, as well as by our entire policy of the past eleven years, we have proved the pacific nature of our intentions, while other countries, rejecting our proposals, give enough ground by their policy to doubt their peaceful intentions toward our Union.<sup>20</sup>

The hostile attitude of a certain portion of the western world toward the Soviet republic was undoubtedly heightened with the economic crisis of 1929 and the years immediately following. To the conservatives of the capitalist world the Reds were always trouble-makers; to the unscrupulous among them the Soviet Union presented a convenient goat to be whipped for all the deepening miseries of the West. In 1930, Stalin spoke of "the tendency toward adventurous sallies against the USSR, toward intervention, which tendency will grow with the development of the economic crisis." He named "the present-day bourgeois France" as "the most outstanding representative of this tendency at this moment."<sup>21</sup>

The tendency to such open and active hostility was checked by the sudden ascent of Hitler. France, by exacting an impossible price from the German democracy, had helped Hitler to power. Now Hitler was threatening not only the Soviet Union but France as well. Moreover, he was dragging Poland in his militant wake—Poland that was counted upon as France's faithful sentry in the East. France suddenly found itself on the

20. M. Litvinov's report to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., published in his *Vneshniaia Politika SSSR* (2nd ed., Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1937), p. 17.

21. Report before the Central Committee of the 16th congress of the Communist Party, summer, 1930, published in I. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma* (10th ed., Moscow: Partizdat, 1935), pp. 357-58.

defensive. Out of sheer necessity, it was ready to make common cause with those elements at home and abroad that stood against aggression.

## V

From the viewpoint of domestic politics, the political rapprochement with the Soviet Union, although occurring in 1933-34, had its roots in that very year of 1927 when the French government for the last time blocked an economic agreement with Moscow. A delegation of French left-wingers to the celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of October declared that the petty bourgeoisie of France were beginning to waver, particularly with regard to the Soviet question:

A certain pause is noticeable. The petty bourgeoisie do not know where to go; there is a feeling of neutrality toward the one side and the other. But this very neutrality proves that the middle classes cannot entirely follow the reactionary forces.<sup>22</sup>

The petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry of France were beginning to realize the errors of the Quai d'Orsay. Thrice had France been offered her chance of advantageous financial settlements with Russia—in 1919, 1922, and the middle 1920's—and all three times she had missed the express of history. The bad management of the ruling group was all too evident by the early 1930's—with the western world, France not excepted, in the throes of the severe economic crisis; with the Soviet Union raising itself by its bootstraps. The spectacle of Hitler's Germany rearming and militant, of Poland deserting the Quai d'Orsay, of England standing aloof, convinced France that she needed Russia's friendship perhaps more than Russia needed hers. In 1933-34, under the pressure of the middle classes, there was a change in policy, and the conservative cabinet of France brought about a rapprochement with the USSR in the interests of security.

The first significant visits of officials and statesmen, with the first assurances of friendship between Paris and Moscow, were exchanged in 1933. This was followed in the summer of 1934 by a *de jure* recognition of the Soviet government by two of France's satellites, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. A few

22. Conversation with K. E. Voroshilov, published in his *Stat'i i Rech'i* (Moscow: Partizdat, 1936), p. 181.

months later it was France who introduced the Soviet Union into the League of Nations; in the very opening of his speech of September 18, 1934, Litvinov pointedly acknowledged the French initiative and particularly the efforts of Barthou, then ably managing the Quai d'Orsay.<sup>23</sup> In December of the same year, Barthou's successor, Laval, signed a protocol for the joint work of the two countries toward an Eastern Security Pact within the framework of the League. Czechoslovakia co-operated wholeheartedly, but other states, patently influenced by Germany and Poland, stayed away. Thus, as a most logical sequence, the treaties of mutual assistance were signed in the next year, 1935, between the Soviet Union and France, as well as between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Defense was their purpose.

France and the USSR stand with rifle grounded and with the hand extended to the world, calling on all other interested powers to join their peaceful efforts, so that it would be possible again to resume the work of reducing the armaments which bear down on the toiling masses of the whole world with their weight.<sup>24</sup>

## VI

To sum up:

In the last twenty years, Franco-Soviet relations have passed from outspoken enmity to co-operation in defense. The rise of Hitler and his anti-communist regime broke the close relations between Germany and the USSR and forced the Soviet Union to push for international collective action for peace. It joined the once-scorned League of Nations and further implemented its provisions, under the terms of the League Covenant, with regional pacts of non-aggression and of mutual assistance. France, on the other hand, has had to look for new friends in the East, in the face of its waning influence in Poland and the Balkans. Hitler has thus been the principal factor in bringing together the former enemies. Although the present Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact has not been implemented with a full military alliance, there is in the present situation a close historical parallel with pre-War history, when Germany's

23. Litvinov, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

24. *Izvestia*, May 12, 1935, here quoted from Harper, op. cit., p. 214.

break with Imperial Russia resulted in the Franco-Russian Alliance.

How secure is the new rapprochement, how lasting?

At the moment of writing, France seems determined to maintain its security pact with the USSR, and this pact, in turn, is the key to Franco-Soviet-Czech relations in eastern Europe. Developments in French relations with Poland and more especially with the Little Entente continue to play a large part in determining French policy in relation to the Soviet Union.

Yet, signs are not lacking that the new path is followed by the Quai d'Orsay rather gingerly. There is no doubt but that there are those elements in France which seek to abandon this alignment. Likewise, it is no secret that Hitler's Germany has tried in more ways than one to persuade the French Foreign Office to transfer its allegiance to a four-power Western pact, excluding the Soviet Union. Within France, the pressure of the nationally-minded masses irks those who would take the country's fate from firm defense to shaky compromise with the aggressors. But those in France who were not consulted in 1919, 1922, and 1927, but who are heeded now to a greater extent, are continuing to urge their government on toward what seems a more dignified and consistent foreign policy, in full keeping with the country's national interests in defense, as reflected in the pact of 1935.

## THE NEW SOVIET ELECTIONS

By

ROSE SOMERVILLE

Twice in recent months countrywide elections have been held in the USSR under the conditions of secret ballot, universal, direct and equal suffrage guaranteed by the federal constitution of 1936 and the republic constitutions of 1937. The significance of these elections seems to lie not in elements of contest but rather in the campaign of political education for the citizenry. There were other features of note in the elections and while it would be foolhardy to dogmatize about the permanence of any of them, it is instructive to examine what seem to be the basic characteristics of the new type of election.

In June of this year the eleven union republics and the twenty-two autonomous republics of the Soviet Union for the first time under their new constitutions held elections to their respective unicameral parliaments. The Supreme Soviet of each republic is elected for four years and is its sole legislative organ. These elections were treated in the Soviet Union as no less important than the election to the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1937, the first to be held under the new federal constitution. In fact the popular slogan during the republic elections was "to conduct them better and in a more organized fashion than the previous election."

The political structure of the Soviet Union is an expression of its nationality policy; the division into republics and regions is largely on the basis of nationality. The names of a few of the units are indicative of the claim to give the various peoples the opportunity for political as well as economic and cultural development: The Uzbek SSR, the Armenian SSR, the Moldavian ASSR, the Volga-German ASSR, the Jewish Autonomous Region. The structure of the Soviet State is such, it is

---

Rose Somerville spent most of the two years, 1935-1937, in the Soviet Union, studying its governmental structure. She was there during the period of the discussion and adoption of the new constitutions and gathered materials to be included in the doctoral dissertation on which she is now working at Columbia University.

maintained, as to provide the nationalities with opportunity to progress from one form of self-government to another in accordance with concrete conditions. The progression of Kirgizia, for instance, from an autonomous region, to an autonomous republic, to a union republic, is cited to show the increasing economic and cultural maturity of the nationalities and the correspondingly dynamic nature of the political structure.

### *New Class Composition*

Some ten years ago it would not have been possible to conduct elections by secret ballot amongst the various nationalities. The Bolsheviks had not yet conquered the illiteracy and the low level of political development of the multi-national population inherited from the Tsars. Nor was universal and equal suffrage considered possible at that time. Sharp class lines reflected an economy only partially socialist. Urban representation in the soviets had been made, accordingly, between two and three times greater than the rural. But two Five-Year Plans have seen an expanded school system, the collectivization of the countryside, and industrialization reaching into the steppe and the desert. Giving the peasantry now an equal vote with the workers did not mean a weakening of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, the Communists declared, for the peasantry was a new, a collective farm peasantry, whose interests were no longer in antagonistic relation to those of the working class, the former proletariat. "The working class and its Government have won such prestige and confidence on the part of the masses of the peasantry and other sections of the working population that there is no longer any need of restricting the rights of any portion of the citizenry," declared Molotov in a speech on the draft of the federal constitution (July 1936). The actual elections bore out this confidence, for while many kolkhoz members were sent to the Supreme Soviets there was no attempt on the part of rural areas to use their increased representation to secure spokesmen for "farm" interests. The collectivization of farming and the network of schools and machine-tractor stations had been a far step in lessening the political distance between town and country.

The intelligentsia, a new intelligentsia with over 80 per cent of its members recruited from the workers and peasants and trained in Soviet schools, "must serve the people, for there are no longer any exploiting classes" for it to serve. Disfranchisement of particular groups as a weapon against their open hostility was no longer necessary; it was now possible to introduce the "universal suffrage *without any restrictions*" which Lenin in 1919 saw as a desirable possibility for the future. Every citizen of 18 or over, regardless of race, religion, sex, education, domicile, social origin, property status and past activities is entitled to a single vote, according to the Constitution of the USSR. Women and Red Army men are specifically granted the right to elect and be elected. The insane and persons convicted by court of law to sentences including deprivation of electoral rights are the only ones denied the vote.<sup>1</sup>

To avail himself of his right to vote the elector in the USSR is not required to register. The local soviets are made responsible for compiling alphabetical lists of those eligible to vote which must be posted for public inspection thirty days before election. The list can include nothing besides names, ages, and addresses. When some districts in the Crimean ASSR in drawing up the lists of voters added a column for literacy and another for nationality, the Central Executive Committee of the republic took steps against such violations of the electoral law. The compilation of the lists of voters was not an easy task. In Moscow, for instance, there were several thousand individuals all with the same surname, Ivanov, many of whom had identical given names and patronymics. Only their ages and addresses distinguished them. Even this was uncertain identification for the same difficulties that hampered the work of the census of 1937 were operative here: many streets in a given city had the same name, houses often lacked numbers and boundaries were sometimes uncertain. For these reasons the elector was urged to check up on the accuracy of the list, not only for his own name but, as a matter of social duty in the preparatory election work, for all errors he might notice, whether of the improper exclusion of his neighbor's name or

1. Administrative withdrawal of election rights was thus at an end. A. Vishinsky, State's Attorney, also cautioned that insanity must be legally-scientifically declared and not depend merely on the opinion of acquaintances. "The Election Law of the RSFSR," *Pravda*, May 5, 1938.

the improper inclusion of one deprived of electoral rights. The work of drawing up the lists for the republic elections was considerably lightened by reference to the lists compiled for the federal election.

The magnitude of the task of inducting a recently literate population, familiar only with voting by show of hands, into the mysteries of ballots, booths, and boxes had also lessened considerably by the time of the republic elections. The population was experienced by virtue of the federal election. It had learned that to write in "Stalin" on a ballot in a district where he was not a candidate was an undesired expression of enthusiasm, for it resulted in a "spoiled ballot" and, by decreasing figures on how many had voted for the candidates, weakened the picture which the Soviet Union wished to present to the world of its "moral and political unity." Not only the electorate but many of the thousands of agitators and members of election commissions were experienced. They could not avoid learning of their mistakes in the federal election; the daily press had reported instances of organizational error, of overstepping of authority, of bureaucratic attitudes, of denial of rights.

### ***A Campaign of Education***

In February and March, 1938, the Central Executive Committee of each republic met to adopt its "Rules on Elections to the Supreme Soviet." Speakers stressed the conformity of their electoral law with the federal electoral law and with the federal and republic constitutions. The "Rules" adopted in each republic differed only as to the number of inhabitants to be included in an electoral district. The speeches at these meetings were a forecast of the scope of subject matter to be discussed in the ensuing meetings and in the study circles that made of the vast election campaign *an intensive two-months course for the Soviet citizen in the domestic and foreign affairs of the Soviet Union*. International relations, industrial developments, agricultural achievements, cultural expansions, the development of the formerly suppressed peoples—all these, interlarded with criticism of lagging departments and leaders and with warnings against traitors, made up a substantial dish



in an educational repast to which the population's new literacy and sharpened political appetite prepared it to do justice.

"The election campaign has done one thing for all of us," observed a collective farmer, "it made us pause and take notice of all the great changes in our country for the last twenty years, and particularly the great transformation in our own lives. Ordinarily one is kept too busy with everyday work to look back and observe his own progress. The election campaign made us do it." This comment on the federal election was echoed in the republic campaigns.

Like the federal election, the republic elections were the occasion for the appearance in the press of articles, loaded with statistics, on the growth of well-being in this republic or that. An article on the Ukraine or Tadzhikistan "on the eve of the elections" would turn out to be a recital of the injustices it had suffered before the revolution in contrast with a detailed account of present industrial, agricultural, and cultural developments. It was a public stock-taking which displayed the Bolshevik view of the credit and debit side of the ledger and which served as material for lectures and discussions in the hundreds of thousands of circles (*kruzhki*) which had been set up among hunters and fishermen, in factories and on farms, for the study of the constitutions, the election laws, and other election materials. Floods of election literature, copies of the constitutions, brochures written in simple question-answer form, reprints of famous speeches, were poured out over the land in many languages and priced encouragingly for the use of the study circles. "More than seventy-two million copies of books and pamphlets have been published this year in the RSFSR in connection with the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR," states a Soviet newspaper. There were 50,000 copies of a "Diagram of the State Structure of the RSFSR." Advertisements of reading materials in newspapers declared: "Every elector should know the constitution and the electoral law of his republic."

Housewives were encouraged to start wall newspapers in their apartment houses, to join the vast "army" of Party and non-Party propagandists. They heard once more Lenin's words on woman's forsaking her narrow drudgery to participate in

social enterprise and in the work of the state apparatus. They were stimulated by the large number of women candidates for the Supreme Soviets. In many republics women make up a fourth of the parliament, in some the proportion is even larger. While in the federal Supreme Soviet women constitute only 16 per cent of the membership, a large proportion when compared with governments outside the Soviet Union, in the Tadzhik Republic 30 per cent of the Supreme Soviet is made up of women. The figure is large in other eastern republics as well, marking a signal victory for Bolshevik efforts to emancipate the eastern woman from her serf-like status. Of course, there are many Russians and Ukrainians living in the eastern republics and some of the women elected are of these nationalities.

As in the previous election, parks were the center of much agitational activity. Lectures, meetings, consultation stands drew thousands. Nor was it "all work and no play." Concerts, films, museums, the radio, contests, and even airplanes were used to dramatize, to stimulate, to educate. A photography contest and a bicycle run in the federal campaign found their counterparts in the recent elections. The press played no small part in creating a heightened atmosphere. When the "Stalinist Constitution" was adopted, newspapers reported the voluntary surrender of many thieves who had been inspired by its clauses to expiate their sins and join in the new life. The federal election saw press reports that "individual farmers" had reacted to their study of the election law by joining the collective farms. Many of those who were active in the recent campaign are reported to have become candidates for membership in the Communist Party. In fact, campaign workers are regarded as a useful reservoir of Party material.

Not unexpected in a land that sees no divorce of economics and politics but rather the closest of connections between them, was the series of Stakhanov periods with which workers greeted the various stages of the election campaign.

### *The Campaign Workers*

Because the educational-propaganda aspects are among the most significant characteristics of the Soviet elections, it is

worth inquiring who the campaign workers were, by what methods they accomplished their purpose, and what their activities will be in the future.

With the federal election, a new character appeared on the Soviet scene, the *doverennoe litso*, literally a trusted person—or, more understandably, a person to whom some responsibility has been entrusted, in this case the organization of mass political work. *Pravda*, in an editorial devoted to “this new remarkable figure of our days,” cites him as a product of the Soviet electoral system. This *delegated campaigner* is elected by the citizens in the same district pre-election conferences at which they consider candidates for deputy to the Supreme Soviet. To this individual they delegate authority to campaign for their candidates. While every citizen has the right of agitating for the candidates, the *delegated campaigner* does this in the name of the large body which chose him. He is an “official” electioneer. Moreover, he is an organizer of campaign workers. In one Moscow district during the federal election there were two or three *delegated campaigners* to forty campaign workers in each precinct. The *delegated campaigner* takes a leading position in the election campaign, making suggestions to the others, planning gatherings, and initiating lectures which are usually not limited to an account of the social-political views and activities of the candidates but are tied up with the successes achieved by the country as a whole. Many of the *delegated campaigners* who had worked during the December election continued their educational work in the succeeding months and were authorized to conduct agitation in the republic campaigns. Thousands of new ones were drawn into the work as the increased number of election districts and precincts demanded more of them. In one Moscow district alone, 179 *delegated campaigners* were put to work. The proportion of Party members to non-Party people entrusted with this work was usually about three to one.

The *delegated campaigners* were aided by the tens of thousands of campaign workers and propagandists who had volunteered and been drafted for work in the precincts. They were factory workers, students, farmers, housewives, both Party and non-Party, the majority of whom had been given

special training courses. Not all of them worked in their own community, as a factory or an institution would send propagandists to a collective farm whose patron (*shef*) it was. Campaign workers in the rural areas had to go out to the field camps to reach most of the adult population, since it was the season of year for cultivating winter crops and only children, old people, and mothers-to-be remained in the villages. The lectures, phonograph recordings, and field newspapers which were used were aimed not only at increasing the political literacy of the countryside but at stimulating productive efficiency as well.

Much work was carried on in the campaign center (*agit-punkt*) which was set up in most of the precincts and which was visited by electors interested in reading the election literature to be found there, listening to lectures, or taking part in the entertainment occasionally supplied. Campaign work was also carried to the elector's door. In the larger cities a worker might devote himself to a single apartment house. The statements of one such election campaign worker in a house of over 200 residents are revealing: "A campaign worker must be able to talk not only on constitutional rights, but also on a whole series of current and special topics. For example, I have given talks on International Women's Day, on the anniversary of the Paris Commune, on fascist intervention in Spain, Germany's seizure of Austria and other world developments. . . . Our efforts are directed toward drawing ever greater masses into active participation in community affairs, not only at election time but permanently. We strive to broaden cultural as well as political horizons, to discover and rouse the latent abilities of leadership and organization in all the people with whom we come into contact." His concrete results in the house, he recounted, included not only lasting friendships and invitations to tea, but a Red Cross study circle for women which he organized and a wall newspaper which a housewife started with articles on arranging a summer playground for the children of the house. Moreover, another housewife was encouraged to arrange a circulating library in the apartment house, drawing upon the factory library for books. And perhaps the most important achieve-

ment of all was showing "how the voters themselves can work to make public servants live up to their responsibilities," in this case by hastening the house management in its repair of the water supply.

It was thus not only the thousands of *delegated campaigners*, members of election commissions and other campaign workers who were to experience active participation in the governmental process during the campaign. It was regarded as a decided step towards the goal avowed by the Communists of "drawing new strata of the working masses into governing the State."

The value of the campaign workers, "activists" of the election, has been recognized. In *Pravda* it was urged that this type of "active group" become permanent, that the study circles organized by the "active group" be continued and others be formed. "Interesting lectures and discussions on international questions and questions of internal conditions, the current policies, on anti-religious themes, circles, excursions, issuing of wall newspapers, evenings of amateur entertainment, collective visits to the cinema and theatres—the whole arsenal of methods of Bolshevik propaganda must also be used in every degree in the future," declared a *Pravda* editorial. That the work of such "active groups" is not to be limited to periods preceding elections is evident from the notice given in the Soviet press during the summer to indications of continued activity on the part of the *delegated campaigners*, propagandists, and election commissioners. *Pravda* printed the letter of a Stakhanovite who had done electioneering work during the campaign. "The elections have ended but the activity of the campaign workers goes on," he declares. "Our life is diverse and rich with events. We are called to help the population understand the meaning of these events." One such event was the State Loan of the third Five-Year Plan which was launched immediately after the elections. The importance of preparations for the harvesting of the crop constituted another post-election subject to which the "active group" devoted itself.

### ***Election Commissions***

The official election campaigns began in April when the Central Executive Committee of each republic announced the

date for the election of its Supreme Soviet and made public the names of those to serve on its Central Election Commission, which, together with the district and precinct election commissions, supervised the election within each republic. The fifteen members of each Central Election Commission were "representatives of public organizations and societies of toilers." They were apparently appointed in each republic, not elected, and were listed as "from" a particular body, such as a trade union of railroad transport workers, a particular collective farm, a trade union of medical-sanitary workers, a university, a factory, a detachment of border guards, a unit of the Communist Party, and so on. Each Central Executive Committee also announced the formation of election districts from each of which a deputy to the Supreme Soviet was to be elected.<sup>2</sup> These districts ranged in number from over 700 in the RSFSR to 200-300 in smaller republics and less than 150 in autonomous republics.

The first of many meetings of electors now began. In factories and institutions, on farms and ships, meetings were held to propose candidates for the District Election Commissions. Communist Party members and non-Party people in diverse callings—architects and collective farmers, engineers and fishermen—were put forward, often on the basis of their organizational achievements during the federal election. These District Election Commissions elected at these meetings were approved by the Central Executive Committee of each republic.<sup>3</sup> Many were drawn into the work of the election commissions, as an individual could serve on only one election commission whether it was central, district, or precinct<sup>4</sup> and the number of election commissions was increased as compared with the federal election. In the RSFSR there were 90,000 precincts in the recent election, each with its commission.

2. In future elections of the Supreme Soviets of the republics, both the endorsement of the Central Election Commissions and the formation of election districts will be a function of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet which was not yet in existence.

3. The approval will in the future be a function of the presidiums of the supreme soviets and of the soviets of territories and provinces.

4. In future elections members of the Precinct Election Commissions are to be endorsed by the city and district soviets. *Pravda*, May 26, 1938, reported violations of the election law when in several precincts members of the precinct election commissions were not chosen at meetings of citizens but were named by the presidiums of the raion executive committees.

## *Nomination of Candidates*

The procedure followed in nominating candidates to the Supreme Soviets revealed, as in the federal election, that the principle of functional representation had not been wholly abandoned. Foreign commentators, writing about the new federal constitution, had seen in Article 141 the introduction of geographic representation. "Candidates are nominated for election according to electoral districts," reads Article 141, and continues: "The right to nominate candidates is ensured to public organizations and societies of toilers: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies." But the procedure, actually followed in both the federal and republic elections, produced a hybrid, a functional-geographical principle that differed both from the old functional principle and from the innovation of purely geographical representation that some had anticipated. The electoral laws of the republics gave the right of nomination not only to those enumerated in the Constitution but to "general meetings of workers and office employees in enterprises, Red Army men in military units, general meetings of peasants in collective farms, and state farm workers and office employees on state farms." It was actually these occupational units, which under the previous electoral system had elected members of the lower soviets, and apparently not the "public organizations and societies of toilers" designated in the Constitution, that now advanced the candidacy of members of the republic's Supreme Soviet, to be elected by geographical districts. While it was more usual for a farm or a factory to meet as a unit, in some districts several factories or an industrial *combinat* and a collective farm would hold a joint nomination meeting. This often occurred when the candidacy was a foregone conclusion, as in the Stalin Election District in Moscow from which district Stalin had been a candidate in the federal elections. A meeting of 15,000 people in one place would hardly provide the proper atmosphere of deliberation were there any difficulty in deciding on the candidates.

Since electors voted in their district of residence, when a huge plant like the Stalin Auto Plant in Moscow, employing individuals who lived in almost all the districts of that city,

proposed some one as candidate, it meant that many participated in this proposal who would vote in some district other than that of the Stalin Auto Plant. Not only nominating but campaigning had a functional basis to some extent. The election campaign took place at a season of year when many city dwellers move to their country homes (*dachy*) for the summer. This made campaign work at their place of occupation a surer way of reaching them than at their place of residence. In the Stalin Auto Plant, for instance, although the workers were to vote in various districts and for various candidates, propagandists met them in separate groups and discussed their candidates with them.

The meeting of citizens in their places of occupation, having proposed candidates, then voted, as in the federal election, for representatives to be sent to a pre-election district conference (*predvybornoe okruzhnoe soveshchanie*), a meeting which shared the nominating function in each district with the various meetings at which names were first advanced. Voting on nominations in both the occupational units and the district pre-election conferences was by show of hands. Secrecy of voting is guaranteed by the constitution at "elections of deputies," not at nominations. Speeches were made for the people proposed and then the district conference accepted some or all of them. In one Moscow district the meeting approved all nine nominations. The resolution of the district conference declared its "support of the decision of the general meetings of such and such factories, farms, and institutions, to nominate such and such a candidate, or such and such candidates." The district conference, often a meeting of considerable size (1500 in a Tbilisi election district), then requested the consent of the nominees, for the District Election Commission can only register those who have agreed to run. It is at this point that the multiple nominations dwindled down to one acceptance and, hence, to one candidate for each district.

It is interesting to note that there is not only no mention of the district conference either in the constitution or the electoral law, though it is apparently not in contradiction to any provision, but even the later documents referring to the nominations ignore it. Thus, the official registration of the candi-



date by the District Election Commission indicates that the candidate was nominated by general meetings of workers at such and such factories, farms and institutions, with no mention of the action of the pre-election district conference.

### ***Contest and Unity***

While an individual could run for the Supreme Soviet in several republics, he could be a candidate in only one district in each republic, just as in the federal election he could be a candidate in only one election district in the USSR. This meant that a popular figure like Stalin who had been nominated in all the thousands of election districts had to choose one in each republic. In the federal election when Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others received scores of nominations, they appealed for advice to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and in an open letter to the election commissions they told of the Central Committee's decision as to the district in which each was to run. This set a precedent for non-Party people as well. In the republic elections there was no such publicized appeal. Stalin and Molotov were candidates in all the union and autonomous republics. Others accepted fewer nominations: Ezhov 20, Voroshilov 19, Kaganovich 17, Andreev 11, Kalinin 10, Zhdanov 9. A candidate did not have to be a resident of the district or even of the republic in which he was running for parliamentary office. Nor were there any restrictions on the right of members of the federal Supreme Soviet to hold office in the republic Supreme Soviets. In fact, many of the republic candidates were already federal deputies.

As in the federal election only one candidate ran in each district for the Supreme Soviet. Although several were nominated in many districts, only one accepted the nomination in each. Nominations were often made in anticipation of probable refusal. Many factories and farms nominated Stalin and his "companions-in-arms," (*soratniki*) along with less famous individuals. Thus a collective farm put up Molotov, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Ezhov, and a village schoolmistress. The refusal of the first four left only one candidate in the field for that district. But where several individuals of coordinate status were nominated and only one accepted the nomination, some

machinery must have been in operation which is not revealed by the public records. It is possible that in some districts it was patent to the nominees that one of them had the support of several large plants and the others preferred to decline rather than face certain defeat. In other districts one can only surmise that some influence, probably the Communist Party, made the several nominees aware of the desirability of avoiding public contest.

The one-candidate feature was a surprise to many foreign observers, informed and uninformed. The uninformed had anticipated the kind of contest that characterizes western elections. The informed observer had not anticipated a contest of issues—whether the country was to go ahead on the basis of socialism towards communism, the one big issue, was not debatable—, but he had expected a contest of men. Stalin's conversation with Roy Howard in March 1936 had provided, some thought, a basis for this expectation. He had said in his interview with the American newspaperman: "It seems to you that there will not be an electoral struggle. But there will be, and I foresee a very lively electoral struggle. We have not a few institutions which work badly. It sometimes happens that one or another local organ of power does not know how to satisfy one or another of the many-sided and ever-growing needs of toilers of city and country. Did you construct a good school, or not? Did you better living conditions? Are you not a bureaucrat? Did you help make our work more effective, our life more cultured? Such will be the criteria with which millions of electors will approach candidates, discarding the unfit, crossing them out of the lists, putting forward the best and nominating them as candidates." (Translation R.S.)

The contest of men which this statement indicated was apparently to be in securing the nomination and not necessarily in securing election. Some foreign authorities, however, saw the contest as one to be decided on election day.

Stalin's statement has not been "repudiated." In its editorial of February 17, 1938, at the time the Central Executive Committee was adopting electoral laws, *Pravda* quotes this passage from the conversation.

There was undoubtedly some competition in securing the nomination for this or that local favorite. The searching questions that Stalin listed may well have been in the minds of those in the factory or farm who proposed some one as their candidate.<sup>5</sup> But the contest was never one of the factory or farm insisting to the bitter end that its nominee had built a *better* school than some other nominee or had done *more* to better living conditions than the other. To some extent this may have been due to the fact that the differences amongst the nominees appeared to be relatively slight. The biographies of the candidates that were published in the press as part of the campaign agitation invariably listed their Stakhanov work in factory or farm, their constant study, their active participation in the socio-political life of their institutions, their devotion to the Party, to building socialism. Of varied age and occupation, 18 to 65 and shepherd to Academician, the candidates were all reputed to be people of ability in their fields, men and women who had demonstrated their initiative and energy. They were not chosen on the basis of their knowledge of the technique of legislation; the tasks of a deputy to the Supreme Soviet although as yet not completely defined, are wider than merely passing laws. All were apparently considered above a certain level of loyalty and capability.<sup>6</sup> All, it was felt, would be equally representative of the toilers' interests. This, Communists urge, is possible where there are no class antagonisms.

While foreign commentators have professed to see in the one-candidate slate a complete negation of the principle of free and democratic elections, Soviet authorities have seen in it an expression of the unity which Socialism, with the absence of antagonistic classes, makes possible. Universal, equal elections in other countries, they declare, are not only never universal

5. What sort of caucus or meeting, if any, may have been held previous to the placing of certain names before the general nomination meeting in factory or farm is a question which the foreign observer can hardly answer with authority. To a certain extent the same situation applies, of course, to the study of nominations in any country. Some nominees could have been the spontaneous choice of a whole occupational unit but as far as most of the possible nominees were concerned their relative merits must have been the subject of discussion in gatherings that preceded the official nomination meetings. That the Communist Party played a large part in this preliminary but decisive work is not an unsafe guess.

6. During the months of the election campaign there were being held the elections of leading personnel of all Communist Party units up to and including the republic organizations. In the prerequisites laid down for a candidate for Party office may be found some clue to the considerations operative in determining the desirability of a nominee for deputy to the Supreme Soviets. "First, [and the order is perhaps significant] does the given worker deserve political trust, and second, is he capable of handling the work assigned to him." (*Pravda*, March 30, 1938.)

or equal but, under conditions of class conflicts, the pressure of the propertied classes on the unpropertied, they are never entirely "free" or "democratic." They point to parliaments and congresses, made up of lawyers, landowners, the propertied people, presumably representing the interests of the vast majority when the vast majority consists of the property-less. They point to the deputies elected to the supreme soviets—factory workers, locomotive engineers, collective farmers (Party officials and directors of plants and enterprises, too, but rarely constituting a majority)—and query whether under social ownership of the means of production the election of any one of these is not a clearer expression of democracy than the election of a landowner after a bitter contest with a factory owner. In fact a dominant note in the speeches during the election campaign was the Soviet evaluation of their elections as the "freest and most democratic elections in the world."

During the federal election, the Central Committee of the Communist Party addressed an "Appeal" to all voters stressing unity rather than contest in the elections. "The candidates will be common for both the Communists and the non-Party people." All were to run as candidates of "an election bloc of Party and non-Party people"; they were to be the joint candidates of the Communist Party, the trade unions, the Young Communist League, and other social organizations. This "Appeal" was echoed by similar "Appeals" by the Young Communist League, the trade unions, etc.<sup>7</sup> It was unlikely that these "public organizations and societies of toilers" would ever run rival candidates, as there is too great a disparity in the numbers of their membership. The Communist Party, with its two million members and its half-million Sympathizers, is a small numerical force compared with the trade unions with their twenty-two million members, almost a fourth of the voters of the USSR. It was unlikely from another point of view. In all these organizations and societies, the leaders are usually members of the Communist Party and the influence of the Party had penetrated to a point that obviates conflict, especially in the sense of competition, between these bodies and the Party.

7. During the republic elections, too, the device of "Appeal" was used by the Communist Party of the Georgian Republic, by a Conference of Workers in Higher Schools, and, more unusual, by one republic to another.

The right of nomination given these organizations and societies in Art. 141 of the federal constitution, and which apparently has not been used by them in the elections so far, must therefore be interpreted not as contemplating contest but as intending to draw from them their "best people," to fill the soviets with individuals who are outstanding in the organizations to which they belong.

This decision to forego contests of candidates and to make the elections "the clearest demonstration of the moral-political unity of the multi-national soviet people . . . a demonstration of love for the socialist homeland, for the Party, for Comrade Stalin"<sup>8</sup> was undoubtedly influenced by the world situation. The trials and executions had given an impression abroad of a dis-united people; the spread of fascism in Europe had given birth to its antagonist, the United Front, the realization of the need of fighting the greater evil. Molotov, in a speech commenting on the Party's "Appeal," declared, "What can be better from the point of view of the interests of the whole people, what can be better in our conditions, than an harmonious electoral union of Communist and non-Party people for the sake of further victories of Socialism in our country?"

It is not impossible, however, that, with changed conditions, future elections may see a more public contest of men. The electoral laws are prepared for this contingency. They provide for re-balloting if none of the candidates in a district receives an absolute majority of the votes cast. This provision would be invoked with only one candidate if, unlikely indeed, he were so unpopular that more than half the voters spoiled or scratched their ballots. It would operate if two candidates exactly tied, also not very likely. The running of three or more candidates would be more apt to bring the provision into use. Nor is the provision regarded as a dead letter. It was referred to as recently as May 5th in an article in *Pravda* by A. Vyshinsky, State's Attorney. In this regard it will be interesting to watch the province, city and rural elections which will be forthcoming shortly and which are already referred to in the Soviet press.

---

8. "The Soviet authority," I. Trainin, in *Pravda*, December 5, 1937.

## *The Communist Party in the Elections*

While those who ran were candidates of a "bloc of Party and non-Party people," more than half the candidates in each republic and sometimes as many as 75 per cent were members of the Communist Party. In the federal Supreme Soviet 75 per cent of the deputies are Party members. The majority of election commissioners, *delegated campaigners* and other campaign workers were also Party members. There were differences in the proportion in the various republics. In Georgia, for instance, about 25 per cent of the district election commissioners were non-Party, in Armenia 43 per cent. Party leaders were judged by the quality of their work in the elections. "Successful conduct of these elections [to the Supreme Soviets of the republics] will be the first, striking political examination of the newly-elected leaders of the Party organizations," declared *Pravda*. In the campaign work itself, while the Party played a leading role,<sup>9</sup> it sought the participation of non-Party people and organizations. In fact there were few organizations or individuals that did not feel it was "their" election. The vast number of clubs, libraries, factory newspapers of the trade unions, declared Moskatov, Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, should be put at the service of the election campaign. A. Vyshinsky cited the protection of the election rights of citizens as one of the most important tasks of the State's Attorney. There were meetings of local soviets devoted to discussions of the electoral campaign. The Communist Party press made much of the fact that many campaign workers were non-Party, and complained when the soviets and trade unions in the territories left the work to the territorial committee of the Party.

## *The Tally*

The mobility of the population in June did not result in a lowered participation in the elections. In consonance with their

9. This was in line with the new constitution of the USSR which apparently for the first time in Soviet constitutional history defined the nature and role of the Party. "... and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other strata of the toilers unite in the Communist Party of the USSR, which is the vanguard of the toilers in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and which represents the leading core of all organizations of the toilers, both public and State." Article 126.

right to vote "regardless of domicile" the electors who moved between the date of publication of the lists and the date of election were supplied with a document which enabled them to vote in the new election district to which they had gone for either a temporary or a permanent stay even if the new district lay in a wholly different republic. Voting precincts were also set up on trains and boats and in hospitals. It was probably with regret that communicable diseases were still so contumacious, that the electoral laws excluded scarlet fever and diphtheria wards from taking part in the voting. The aged were transported to the polls in automobiles. This concern with ensuring the participation of all electors manifested itself in emphasis on correct compiling of lists of voters. The State's Attorney termed this task "one of the most important, if not the most important, deciding condition for successful preparations for the elections."

It is difficult to determine to what extent an element of "compulsion" entered into the mass turn-out on election day. There is some significance in the fact that foreign correspondents, whose reactions to the elections were not always gratifying to the Soviet authorities, nevertheless did not report any sinister scenes at the polls, any muted threats of force, any signs of intimidation, such as came from Germany during Hitlerite elections. Of those eligible to vote in the USSR, 96.8 per cent took part in the December election and over 99 per cent in most of the republics in the June elections. All of the republics bettered the December record. It is unlikely with registration lists to indicate absences, that the electors could feel they would not be missed at the polls. On the other hand it is more probable that the participation of the millions of voters was a reflection of the educational and agitational work of the preceding months and the pleasant circumstances of election day than an indication of "obedience." The educational work had impressed upon them the aspects of privilege and duty involved in utilization of the franchise. They had heard and read of the literacy and residence qualifications, the poll tax, and the court decision on primaries which deprived a considerable proportion of America's southern population of the vote, the sex qualification which disenfranchised the women

of France, the denial of suffrage to army people in many countries. Also, they felt close to their candidates: either they knew him personally as a fellow-worker or they had heard him speak during the campaign and had read his biography which so closely paralleled their own and that of their Soviet government. They had been impressed with the international significance of a record vote. And, too, voting was made pleasant for them. The balloting place was adorned with pictures and flowers; there was a nursery room in which to leave children while voting. The precinct election commissioners who presided over the desks were those they had nominated for the work and known to many of them personally. There was an air of gaiety; local choirs and dancers performed outside the polling place. It was "free day" and the weather was fair. The press referred to the occasion as *prazdnik* (holiday),<sup>10</sup> and the voters responded in a *prazdnik* mood, wearing their best, lingering at the polling place to watch the performers or to take part in a folk dance, and marching in the mass demonstrations that filled the huge squares and stadiums of the Soviet cities.

Of the millions who took part in the elections, 99 per cent in most of the republics gave their vote to the "bloc" candidates for the Supreme Soviets.<sup>11</sup> While there was little suspense as to who would win, as there was only one candidate running in a district, interest in the Soviet Union was centered on how well they would win, for a great deal of effort had been expended in securing a vote that would "demonstrate to the world once again the moral and political unity of the Soviet people." The number of spoiled and scratched ballots was considerable in absolute numbers but not in percentage. In the RSFSR in the June election 73,226 ballots were invalid<sup>12</sup> and on 320,496 the name of the candidate had been crossed out; both together

---

10. "The forthcoming elections are not simply elections, comrades. They are really an all-people's holiday. . . .", declared Stalin.

11. In some of the autonomous republics the figure was slightly lower, 97.8 per cent, 98.8 per cent, etc., but in general the record excelled even the high returns of the federal election when 98.6 per cent of the voters favored the "bloc" candidates to the Soviet of the Union and 97.8 per cent the "bloc" candidates to the other chamber.

12. The electoral law declares invalid "Ballots which:

- a. are not of the prescribed form and color
- b. are not submitted in envelopes or are submitted in envelopes not of the prescribed form
- c. contain more candidates than the number of deputies to be elected."



constituted only 0.7 per cent of the votes cast in that republic. Whether these ballots are attributable to groups whose enfranchisement had been often protested when the draft constitution was being discussed by the population,<sup>13</sup> is only a matter of speculation in an election with secret ballots.

### *Power of Recall*

The Soviet voters have elected their deputies to the supreme soviets for four years but they may recall some of them before the expiration of that period. Article 142 of the Constitution of the USSR declares it the duty of a deputy to report on his work and the work of the soviet "and he is liable to be recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors." In a speech at an election meeting Stalin reminded the voters of this provision and of the responsibility it placed upon them. "The functions of the voters do not end with the elections . . . it is the duty and right of the electors constantly to exercise control over their deputies." Not all deputies are of the "Lenin type" he warned, declaring, "My advice is to remember this law [of recall] and make use of it if need be."

Whether this recall provision will become an operative part of political life and whether the electoral system in general will retain the features discussed above are questions which will be settled only by future developments in the USSR.

13. Many had felt that former merchants and Tsarist officials as well as clergymen would use the elections for non-socialist ends. During the federal and the republic election campaigns efforts were made to counteract such influence by radio lectures on the anti-Soviet activities of these groups, by discussions of science, and by excursions to anti-religious museums.

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

### Marshal Vasili Konstantinovich Bluecher

Any account of the Soviet regime in the Far East must include mention of the part played therein by Vasili Konstantinovich Bluecher, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Various intriguing versions of his life are extant but Soviet biographies of the man are fairly unanimous. He was born of poor parents in 1889 in the village of Barshchinka, province of Yaroslav. According to some accounts he owes his non-Russian name to the fact that a Yaroslav landowner of Prussian origin inadvertently gave one of his serfs a name which later evolved into the surname of Bluecher's grandfather. The boy had little formal education, having completed only the village school when, like so many other sons of poor peasants, he was sent to St. Petersburg, there to be apprenticed. He soon ran away from his blacksmith master and obtained work, in 1909, as a fitter in a railway car factory. There he led a strike of the workers (1910) for which he was arrested and sent to prison for more than two years.

During the World War, Bluecher served as a private and later as a corporal in the Tsar's army on the Austrian front. Here it is said he showed something of the ingenuity in military affairs which today places him in the ranks of great military leaders. Badly wounded in 1915 he was sent back home to work in industry. In 1916, he joined the Communist Party and the October Revolution found him in Samara where he was elected to the Revolutionary Committee and took a leading part in the establishment of Soviet power.

From the period of foreign intervention and civil war up to the present time, Bluecher has won increasing recognition for military strategy by his repeated victories, often achieved under the most difficult circumstances. In 1918 when the counter-revolutionary forces seized Cheliabinsk and tore up the Siberian Railroad, he was appointed to lead the Red Guards against Dutov, head of the Orenburg Cossack troops. With a combined

force of the relatively few trained soldiers at his command and of the Ural partisan fighters with which he had augmented the regular troops, Bluecher was able to beat off this Cossack leader and to raise the siege on Orenburg.

In the spring of 1918 his contact with the central authorities in Moscow was cut off when the Czech forces attacked the main line of the Siberian Railroad. Convinced that his only hope lay in joining the nearest Red Army base, Bluecher, in command of the Southern Ural Partisan Army, started off on a march that has since become legendary. Over the Ural mountains, through forest and swamp, he led the 10,000 soldiers. Along the route they were joined by volunteers from the civilian population—by Russians, Tatars, Bashkir, Chinese, Chuvash, as well as by stragglers from the ranks of the forces of intervention. Frequently hungry and beset by constant attacks from the Cossacks, they marched for 40 days covering something over 1,000 kilometres before they met a section of the Third Red Army near Kungur. By this time, the whole country had heard of their exploits and in October, 1918, Bluecher was decorated with the Order of the Red Banner—the first award of this rank ever to be given.

A most crucial threat to Soviet power at this time was Admiral Kolchak who, in 1919, had control of Perm. The Central Committee decided to build a strong base at Vyatka from which an attack on the Admiral could be directed. Bluecher was put in charge of this operation and, at the head of the Fifty-First Division, routed Kolchak's forces and drove them from the Urals.

In August, 1920, he was ordered to the fortified base of Kakhovka in the area of the Ukraine controlled by Wrangel. Here workers from the Urals and Siberia formed about 25 per cent of the fighting strength. At Kakhovka, Bluecher defeated the Wrangel forces in what is considered to be a remarkably short campaign. Baron Wrangel had for some time been in complete control of the Crimea, and thither his forces, defeated at Kakhovka, retreated in the fall of 1920. Here, too, the remnants of Denikin's army had taken refuge. Access to the peninsula could be obtained only through the Isthmus of Perekop, a strongly fortified position which the Red Army had been unable

to capture. In November, 1920, Bluecher maneuvered a most skillful attack against this bottleneck that finally forced Wrangel from his stronghold. This proved to be one of the most sensational struggles of the Civil War. Trench warfare and heavy cannon were used as both sides struggled to win the decisive battle. With the defeat of Wrangel, Soviet power was completely established in European Russia.

Of the forces of intervention only the Japanese remained and, in 1921, we find Bluecher in the Far East. The Japanese, utilizing the White Guard forces of Ataman Semenov and Baron Ungern von Sternberg had dominated the Maritime Province and Outer Mongolia. To counteract this, the Soviets had established Red Army units in the Far East. In May, 1920, under orders from Moscow, the Far Eastern Republic was set up at a conference held in Verkhne-Udinsk. In July of that year, the new Republic concluded a treaty with Japan whereby the latter agreed to evacuate the Trans-Baikal Region and this was done when the Red Army reached Chita in October. Later, the Japanese also evacuated Khabarovsk.

In the spring of 1921, the newly formed Provisional People's Government of Mongolia called upon the RSFSR for assistance in driving out the forces of Semenov and Ungern. It is about this time, when the Soviets were thus beset with many difficulties in the Far East, that Bluecher is reported active in the defense of the Far Eastern Republic. Using Chita as a base, he organized and strengthened the military forces, molding the partisan irregulars into a people's army. Ungern had been driven off Soviet territory in May, but again invaded the Trans-Baikal Region in August. At this time, he met decisive defeat by Bluecher with the combined strength of these newly organized troops, the Red Army units and the partisan fighters of Outer Mongolia.

According to some reports, Bluecher then left to attend the Dairen Conference which was held from August, 1921, to April, 1922, as a delegate from the Far Eastern Republic. In any case, it was in December of this year that White Guards launched a new attack and defeated several units of the People's Army at Khabarovsk. Bluecher, by then Commander-in-Chief, War Minister and President of the Military Soviet of

the Far Eastern Republic, began preparations for a counter attack. It was his recommendation that the Whites be attacked at the strategic hill of Lunku-Keran near Volochaevsk Station. In spite of the fact that it was the dead of winter he urged immediate action. The Soviet forces were moved up a distance of some thirty miles through deep snows, often unable to light campfires for fear of attracting enemy artillery fire. The ensuing battle of Volochaevsk lasted three days and on February 12, 1922, the Soviet army finally succeeded in capturing the key position. This decisive victory marked the beginning of the end of Japanese intervention; by the end of 1922, in measure due to the international situation, the Japanese and the White Guards had disappeared from Soviet territory except for the forces which Japan maintained on Northern Sakhalin until 1925. Following the Volochaevsk victory, Bluecher received high tribute in Moscow for the part he had played in the consolidation of Soviet power.

In 1924, following the request of Sun Yat-sen, Chinese revolutionary leader, for Soviet assistance, Bluecher, under the name of General Galen, became military adviser to the Canton National Government. Here he played an important role in the formation of the Chinese Revolutionary National Army, noted for the famous "Northern campaign." However, in 1927, following the split in the Chinese revolutionary forces, he returned to Moscow and was then appointed Assistant Commander of the Ukrainian Military District.

The outbreak of further disturbances in the Far East brought him back to the scene of his former activities. When, in 1929, Chinese militarists began to harass the Soviet Far Eastern borders and to attack the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the Special Far Eastern Army was formed with Bluecher at its head. In the fall of that year, he carried the conflict on to enemy territory and defeated the Chinese forces at several points, among them, Mishanfu, Manchuria Station and Jalainor, before returning to Soviet soil. In these encounters, Bluecher's men captured thousands of prisoners and considerable military equipment.

For this successful rebuff to the Chinese militarists, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star and his army given the Order of the Red Banner. In 1930, the name of his army was officially

changed to the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army and, in 1935, Bluecher was given the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union, the country's highest military honor. In December, 1937, he was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the Voroshilov election district of the Far Eastern Region and in June, 1938, to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. More recently the quality of the special Red Banner Far Eastern Army which he has trained was tested during the fighting with the Japanese in the vicinity of Changkufeng Hill (July-August, 1938). The successful defense of Soviet territory in that engagement is held by many observers to be of considerable significance in current international affairs.

Throughout his career, Marshal Bluecher has acted in the capacity of Bolshevik leader as well as of military strategist. Especially in the Ural district and in the Far Eastern Republic he had to win over the local population to an understanding of Soviet principles before he could rally them to his ranks. He is described as a stern disciplinarian of both the civilian and military elements under him, and as one who attempts likewise to instill a realization of the need for such discipline during troubled times.

## NEWS CHRONOLOGY

Newspapers are named primarily for convenient reference, although the same items may appear in other newspapers. The date given is the date on which the event occurred, while the number in parentheses following the name of the newspaper indicates the date of the paper in which the report appeared.

\*The texts of decrees, treaties, etc., referred to in the items marked with an asterisk are available in full at the office of the American Russian Institute.

### INTERNAL AFFAIRS

#### Administration

#### JUNE

During the month, elections were held in the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics for the delegates to their respective Supreme Councils.

- 3—The Donets Oblast is divided into the Stalin Oblast and the Voroshilovgrad Oblast.—*Izvestia* (4)

#### JULY

During the month, the Supreme Councils of the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics met for the first time under their new constitutions.

- 1—The new 4 per cent, twenty-year loan of five billion rubles for industry and defense is floated.—*New York Times* (2)
- 27—The Council of People's Commissars issues an order for the organization of an all-Union census in 1939.\*—*Izvestia* (27) (See *Bulletin of the Soviet Union*, Aug. 30)

#### AUGUST

- 10—The second session of the Supreme Council of the USSR meets.—*Pravda* (11)
- Commissar of Finance, Zverev, reports on the Budget for 1938 to the two houses of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union in joint session.—*New York Times* (11) (See *Bulletin of the Soviet Union*, Sept. 15th)
- The Commissariat of Finance closes subscriptions to the 1938 loan, as it is over-subscribed.—*Pravda* (11)
- 21—The second session of the Supreme Council of the USSR adjourns, after approving the Budget for 1938, passing a new law on the election of judges, a new citizenship law, and imposing a tax on horses.—*New York Times* (22) (See *Bulletin of the Soviet Union*, Sept. 30th)
- 22—L. M. Kaganovich is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.—*New York Times* (23)
- I. G. Kabanov is appointed Commissar of the Food Industry of the USSR, replacing A. L. Gilinsky.—*New York Times* (23)

## Agriculture

### JUNE

- 18—The 1938 plan for the livestock industry is published.\*—*Pravda* (18)
- 20—Special exemptions from taxes are granted collective farmers who work in the timber industry.—*Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* (20)
- 24—The plan for the organization of harvest work is published.\*—*Pravda* (24)  
—The Council of People's Commissars issues an order regulating the payment of combine drivers and giving bonuses for high output.\*—*Pravda* (24)

### AUGUST

- 9—The Commissariat of Agriculture orders that 1300 combines be transferred from the south to Siberia to help with the harvest.—*Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* (9)
- 12—An order is issued on the payment of transport workers engaged in threshing.—*Pravda* (12)
- 20—The Supreme Council passes a decree imposing a tax on horses owned by farmers. The law is aimed to prevent speculation in livestock.—*New York Herald Tribune* (21)  
—It is reported that severe hot wind storms have somewhat affected grain crops in the south of the Soviet Union and will probably bring the harvest below the 1937 record crop.—*New York Times* (21)
- 21—The Soviet Agricultural Exhibition scheduled to open in August is postponed another year.—*New York Herald Tribune* (22)

## Arctic

### JUNE

- 6—The Scientific Research Institute on Arctic Agriculture is transferred from Leningrad to Igarka.—*Izvestia* (6)  
—Sir Hubert Wilkins is the guest of the Soviet government, at the end of his search for Levanovsky. It is reported that he held informal discussions with Soviet Arctic authorities on his proposed submarine trip to the North Pole.—*New York Times* (7)
- 10—A Soviet biologist working on Henrietta Island discovers a copper cylinder containing part of Lieutenant-Commander De Long's record of his Arctic expedition in 1879.—*New York Times* (11)
- 15—A second relic of the De Long North Pole Expedition is found on Henrietta Island. Both relics will be sent to the Arctic Institute in Leningrad for study.—*New York Times* (16)

### JULY

- 3—It is reported that the grave of Georgi Sedov, Russian explorer who died in 1914 while trying to reach the North Pole, had been found on Rudolph Island.—*New York Times* (4)
- 8—The navigation season on the Kara Sea opens.—*Industria* (8)

### AUGUST

- 8—The new ice-breaker *Joseph Stalin*, after completing its tests, goes to the Arctic.—*Izvestia* (8)
- 12—The Soviet government announces the official conclusion of the search for Levanovsky, lost over the Arctic a year ago.—*Pravda* (12)
- 14—The new ice-breaker *Lazar Kaganovich* is undergoing preliminary tests.—*Industria* (14)
- 19—A buoy from the Baldwin Arctic Expedition of 1902 is found off the north-west shore of Novaia Zemlia.—*Pravda* (19)



## Art

### JUNE

- 1—At the Ysaye Contest for young pianists, held in Brussels, the Soviet musicians Emil Gilels and Yakov Flier win first and third places, respectively.—*Izvestia* (1) (See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, Aug. 15)
- 16—The Committee on Cinema organizes a contest for movie scenarios.—*Izvestia* (16) (See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, Aug. 15)

### AUGUST

- The Committee on Art of the Moscow Soviet has appointed Vsevolod Meyerhold, Peoples Artist of the RSFSR, a Director of the Stanislavsky Opera Theatre. (*Art and Culture in the Soviet Union*, July, 1938.)
- 7—Constantin Stanislavsky, founder of the Moscow Art Theatre, dies in Moscow at the age of 75.—*New York Times* (8)
- 25—Alexander Kuprin, Russian novelist who returned to the Soviet Union in 1937, dies in Moscow.—*New York Herald Tribune* (26)

## Aviation

### JUNE

- 11—Regular air service is opened between Krasnoiarsk and Igarka.—*Pravda* (11)
- 28—The Soviet aviators, Kokkinaki and Briandinski, make a non-stop flight from Moscow to Spaask-Dalny, near Vladivostok, a distance of 4,689 miles, in 24 hours, 36 minutes.—*Pravda* (28)

### JULY

- 3—Three Soviet women fliers make a non-stop flight from Sevastopol to Archangel.—*Izvestia* (3)
- 18—The Moscow-Riga-Stockholm airline opens for regular passenger service.—*Izvestia* (17)

### AUGUST

- 17—Colonel Lindbergh and Mrs. Lindbergh land in Moscow from Warsaw. They are in Moscow for the Air Exhibition to be put on in connection with Soviet Aviation Day.—*New York Times* (18)
- 18—The Soviet Union celebrates Aviation Day.—*Pravda* (18)

## Industry

### JUNE

- 4—Plans for the total industrial production for the third quarter of 1938 average 28 per cent above output during the corresponding period of 1937.—*New York Times* (5) (See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, Aug. 30)
- 26—The Council of People's Commissars adopts standards for the construction of kindergartens, creches and maternity wards.\*—*Izvestia* (26) (See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, August 15, 1938)
- It is announced that the Commissariat of Food Industry has fulfilled its plan for the first half of 1938.—*Izvestia* (26)
- 28—The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions orders the organization of commissions on wages in all factory committees of trade unions.—*Industria* (28)

### JULY

- 15—The Council of People's Commissars issues an order for increased production of consumers goods from the industrial commissariats.\*—*Pravda* (15)

### AUGUST

- 31—After the successful completion of a test run by gas-generator trucks, which generate their own fuel from wood, production of 56,000 such vehicles is scheduled for the next two years.—*New York Times* (Sept. 1)

## Transportation

### JUNE

- 13—The construction of the railroad from Kelasuri to Sukhumi, which makes a direct line between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, is completed.—*Pravda* (13)
- 29—A new express ship line is opened on the Black Sea, joining Kherson—Odessa—Evpatoria—Sevastopol and Yalta.—*Izvestia* (29)

### JULY

- 30—In connection with the celebration of Railroad Day, the new electrified line from Moscow to Tsaritsyn is opened for regular passenger service.—*Pravda* (30)

## Miscellaneous

### JUNE

Conferences and Congresses of the Communist Party organizations throughout the Soviet Union were held during the month to elect officers. During the month, the State examinations for 1938 were held in the institutions of higher education.

- 9—The alphabet used in the Moldavian Autonomous Republic is changed from Latin script to Russian script.—*Izvestia* (9)
- 15—Several executives in the Commissariat of Trade are dismissed as a result of the poor organization of the distribution of food products.—*New York Times* (16)
- 16—A telegraph line from Moscow to Erevan is opened.—*Pravda* (16)
- 22—A telephone and telegraph line is to be built from Moscow to Khabarovsk.—*Industria* (22)
- 23—It is announced that more than 14 million depositors have savings, totalling 5.3 billion rubles, in 23,684 savings bank offices in the USSR.—*Pravda* (23)

### AUGUST

- 1—Admissions to military schools are closed for 1938/39.—*Pravda* (1)
- Examinations for admission to the higher educational institutions begin today.—*Izvestia* (1)
- 7—The last Lutheran church in Moscow is closed.—*New York Times* (8)
- 24—Ten former officials of Azerbaidzhan are sentenced to death for treason.—*New York Times* (25)
- 26—The new Gorky line of the Moscow subway is inspected by government officials.—*New York Herald Tribune* (27)

---

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### European Affairs

#### JUNE

- 2—The Soviet Union agrees to the plan for withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain on condition that international observers are permanently stationed in Spanish ports.—*New York Herald Tribune* (3)
- 4—It is reported that the Soviet ship, *Kataiama*, has been detained by the Spanish rebels as it passed Gibraltar.—*Pravda* (4)
- 21—The Soviet Union agrees to the closing of the Spanish frontiers to munitions deliveries, under the terms of the general plan for the evacuation of foreign troops from Spain.—*New York Times* (22)

- 24—The USSR refuses to pay for the maintenance of volunteers in Franco's army while the count is being taken prior to their evacuation.—*New York Times* (25)
- 25—It is reported that the Soviet government is concerned over the penetration of German influence in Iran.—*New York Times* (26)
- 26—The Soviet ship, *Maks Gelts*, which was seized by the Spanish rebels, is released along with the crews of the *Lensoviet* and the *Akademik Pavlov*, which had been held since March 18 and May 3, respectively.—*Izvestia* (26)

## JULY

- 1—The Franco-Turkish pact concerning Sanjak is regarded as a possible link in Soviet-French relations to facilitate military cooperation in case of war.—*New York Times* (2)
- 5—England, France, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union finally agree on a plan for the evacuation of foreign troops from Spain. The plan now must be submitted for approval to Barcelona and Burgos.—*New York Times* (6)
- 6—The USSR and Great Britain sign a naval pact to bring the Anglo-Soviet naval agreement of July 30, 1936, into accord with the 45,000-ton limit for battleships set by Great Britain, the United States and France. The pact does not apply to naval forces in the Pacific, since Japan has not agreed to the limit.—*New York Times* (7)
- 9—The Soviet Union protests a violation of its border by a Finnish airplane.—*Industria* (16)
- 13—The Soviet Union protests a violation of its border by a Latvian airplane.—*Industria* (17)
- 22—The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs protests to Poland on the "surveillance" to which its embassy employees are subjected in Warsaw.—*New York Times* (23)
- 23—A spokesman of the French Foreign Office rejects the idea of a four-power European agreement, between France, England, Germany, and Italy, on the grounds that it would mean the scrapping of the League of Nations and that it would exclude the Soviet Union.—*New York Times* (24)

## AUGUST

- 3—French foreign minister Bonnet conferred with the Soviet Ambassador in regard to the Far Eastern situation. French circles were reported to be assured there was no reason for alarm.—*New York Times* (4)
- 15—Sir William Seeds is appointed to succeed Viscount Chilton as British Ambassador to the USSR.—*New York Herald Tribune* (16)
- 16—It is reported that roads are being built across Rumania linking the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.—*New York Times* (17)
- The Polish Consul in Moscow discusses with the Soviet Foreign Office the liquidation of the situation regarding their embassies.—*Pravda* (17)

## Far Eastern Affairs

## JUNE

- 17—A report from Hongkong states that Soviet Russia has furnished China with bombers and pursuit planes.—*New York Times* (18)
- 25—A border incident is reported near Blagoveshchensk.—*Izvestia* (26)
- 29—The USSR charges that Japan violates the Portsmouth Treaty by detaining a Soviet ship in Laperuza Bay.—*Industria* (29)

## JULY

- 1—General L. S. Lushkov, formerly a high officer in the Soviet Far Eastern armed forces, flees from the Soviet Union to Japan.—*New York Times* (2)
- 15—The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs rejects a demand made by the Japanese Ambassador that Soviet border guards evacuate an area near Changkufeng on the Soviet-Korean-Manchurian border.—*Pravda* (22) (See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, Aug. 15)
- 18—TASS, the official Soviet news agency, denies a Japanese report that Soviet soldiers crossed the Manchurian border on July 11.—*Industria* (18)
- 20—Litvinov and Shigemitsu, Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, have an interview in which the demand is repeated that Soviet troops evacuate from Changkufeng and the Japanese threaten the use of force if it is not met. Litvinov rejects the demand on the grounds that the territory is Soviet under the terms of the Hunchung Agreement of 1886.—*Pravda* (22)
- 29—Serious fighting between Soviet and Japanese troops takes place near Changkufeng.—*Pravda* (July 1)

## AUGUST

- 3—The facsimile of the map attached to the Hunchung Agreement of 1886 delimiting the frontier in the region of Changkufeng is published in Moscow newspapers.—*Izvestia* (3)
- 10—A truce is arranged between the Japanese and Soviet forces at Changkufeng, as of noon August 11. Following the armistice, a commission of two Soviet representatives and two Japanese-Manchoukuoan representatives will redemarcate the border.—*New York Times* (11)
- 12—The Turkish Foreign Office protests to the Japanese Embassy on the meeting of Japanese diplomats to be held in Istanbul which is reported to be anti-Soviet in character.—*Pravda* (12)
- 13—A border incident is reported on Sakhalin in which two Japanese are killed.—*New York Times* (13)
- 15—The Japanese Embassy assures the Turkish Foreign Office that the meeting of diplomats is a purely routine meeting of Japanese diplomatic officials in that region.—*Izvestia* (15)
- 17—The Japanese Government reports that the truce at Changkufeng is fully in effect and the two governments agree that further questions arising out of the truce are to be handled by commanders at the scene.—*Pravda* (18)
- 20—Moscow sends a protest to Tokyo on the mistreatment of the officers and crew of the Soviet ship *Refrigerator I*, retained by Japanese authorities.—*New York Times* (21)
- 23—Ambassador Shigemitsu protests to Litvinov over the reported flights of Soviet planes over Korean territory.—*New York Times* (23)

## United States, Affairs concerning

## JUNE

- 5—Ambassador Davies, on his departure from Moscow to take up his new post in Brussels, has interviews with Kalinin, Molotov and Stalin.—*Pravda* (6)
- 25—In a pre-election speech, Foreign Commissar Litvinov expresses doubt as to whether the United States will actively attempt to check fascism on the European continent.—*New York Herald Tribune* (26)

## JULY

12—Howard Hughes lands in Moscow on his round-the-world flight.—*New York Times* (12)

## AUGUST

6—The Soviet-American Commercial Agreement is extended for one year. Under the terms of the agreement, the Soviet Union guarantees to buy at least \$40,000,000 of American goods during the coming 12 months, and in return the United States grants Soviet trade most-favored-nation treatment. The Soviet Union also agrees to limit its shipment of anthracite to the United States to 400,000 tons during the 12 months.—*New York Herald Tribune* (7)

8—American exports to the USSR in June were twice as great as those of June, 1937.—*New York Times* (9)

## Miscellaneous Foreign Affairs

## JUNE

25—In a pre-election speech, Kalinin reiterates the position of the Soviet Union in world affairs, emphasizing that it is surrounded by hostile capitalist countries and urging the building of a large navy.—*New York Times* (26) and *New York Herald Tribune* (July 4)

---

## ERRATA

Through an error, the statistics for Soviet foreign trade in 1937, published in the July issue of the *Quarterly*, did not include those for Soviet exports to Japan.

	Principle Article of Export in 9 mos. of 1937	1936		1937	
		Tons	Thousand Rubles	Tons	Thousand Rubles
Japan	Oil	888,306	27,679	249,839	11,743

(These figures include exports of oil from the Japanese concessions in the Soviet part of Sakhalin)

---

## ANNOUNCEMENT

The complete text of the 1938 Unified State Budget will appear in the next issue of the *Quarterly*. The *Bulletin on the Soviet Union* for September 15 contains a brief analysis of this Budget.

## WOMEN IN THE SOVIET EAST

By Fannina W. Halle

A BRILLIANT first-hand account of the emergence of the new woman from the barbarous and primitive East, freed from the shackles of centuries. This book, based on material gathered on trips through Soviet Central Asia, opens up a new world to Western Eyes; it is packed with entertaining anecdotes, new, valuable and revealing information; it is carefully documented, profusely illustrated, and makes fascinating reading, in addition to being an important sociological study.

351 pp. Illustrated \$4.00

E. P. DUTTON & CO., INC.  
300 Fourth Avenue New York

## EXHIBITS on the U. S. S. R.

*Just received from the Soviet Union*

Soviet Caricatures  
Soviet Photographic Art

*Still Available*

The Soviet Union—1938  
50 Panels

Covering government, national economy, labor, agriculture, rights of citizens and defense.

Soviet Architecture  
Children's Water Colors  
Illustrating Pushkin's Poems

Also Miscellaneous  
Photographs and Posters

For further information write to  
The American Russian Institute, Inc.  
56 West 45th Street  
New York City

## NEW BOOKS published in the USSR

### *In English:*

- KARL MARX—Selected works in two volumes. Prepared by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. Edited by V. Adoratsky ..... \$2.50
- MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTIONS by Joseph Stalin ..... \$1.20
- LABOR IN THE LAND OF SOCIALISM. The roots of Stakhanov movement, its significance and the forms in which it expresses itself strikingly and convincingly explained. .... \$1.00
- THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF SOVIET MINERAL RESOURCES by Academician A. E. Fersman ..... \$1.00
- FOUR SOVIET PLAYS. Outstanding plays by Maxim Gorky, N. Pogodin, V. Vishnevsky and I. Kocherga ..... \$1.25
- AND QUIET FLOWS THE DON by Mikhail Sholokhov ..... \$1.50

### *In Russian:*

STALINSKAYA KONSTITUTSIYA SOTSIALIZMA. "20 Years of Socialist Construction" — A loose-leaf, cloth-bound album, with removable covers, 330 pages of multi-colored pictorial charts and graphs depicting cultural

and industrial developments of the Soviet Union. Size—22"x13½". Published by the All-Union Institute of Graphic Statistics. .... \$10.00

VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SSSR. Speeches and Statements during 1927-1937 on the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R. .... \$ .80

VOLGA IDET V MOSKVVU by P. Lopatin. "Volga Goes to Moscow"—the story of the Volga-Moscow Canal, with many illustrations. .... \$ .90

KHLEB by Alexei Tolstoi. "Bread—or The Defence of Tzaritzin"—a vivid novel of the Civil War of 1918—by a brilliant Soviet writer. .... \$ .85

LITERATURNO-KRITICHESKIE STATEE by Maxim Gorky. A collection of articles and literary sketches of great value. .... \$2.00

E. Tarle—Nashestvie Napoleona Na Rossiyu v 1812 godu (Napoleon's invasion in 1812). Founded on memoirs and documents from the State Archives, tells about the heroic struggle of the Russian people in 1812. The scientific merit and the easy style of this book is of inestimable value to all those interested in history. .... \$1.20

**BOOKNIGA 255 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y.**

Please mention *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG  
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

# amerasia

A REVIEW OF AMERICA  
AND THE FAR EAST

Edited by experts in the field . . . *Amerasia* focuses attention and stimulates widespread public thinking on this country's relation to the Far East . . . presents articles by recognized authorities who invariably write more forthrightly than is generally done in the field of war, politics, economics and colonial problems.

The next few issues of *Amerasia* will act as a forum for discussion of the vital questions raised by Nathaniel Peffer in his article, "A Year of War: The Need for a Change in American Attitude and Action" (August issue) and by Philip J. Jaffe in "A Discussion of a Plan for an American Loan to Industrialize China" (September issue).

---

*Amerasia* is available only by subscription.  
Enclose 25 cents if you wish a single issue.

---

AMERASIA . 129 East 52nd Street . New York City

Please send *Amerasia* for 12 months beginning with

☐ Bill me for \$2.50.

☐ I enclose \$2.50.

Name .....

Address .....

Please mention *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*.

The Fall Issue of  
**SCIENCE & SOCIETY**  
A MARXIAN QUARTERLY

Vol. II, No. 4

**PROMETHEUS BOUND: GOVERNMENT AND  
SCIENCE IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY**

What the Aristocratic divorce of theory and practice did  
to Greek Science *Benjamin Farrington*

**THE EBB OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS**

The first Marxist Critique of this prominent American School  
*Addison T. Cutler*

**PUBLIC WORKS IN TWO DEPRESSIONS**

Why a Huge Housing Program is Necessary  
*Vladimir D. Kazakévich*

**SOME EFFECTS OF THE DEPRESSION ON THE  
NEGRO IN NORTHERN CITIES**

*E. Franklin Frazier*

**THE POETRY OF ARCHIBALD MacLEISH**

*Dorothy Van Ghent*

**SOCIALISM AND INEVITABILITY**

*Corliss Lamont*

**DIALECTICS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES**

*Ralph B. Winn*

**Merton's *Science and Technology in 17th Century  
England***

*Joseph Needham*

**Clark's *Science and Social Welfare in the Age of  
Newton***

*D. J. Struik*

**Jackson's *Charles Dickens, The Progress of a Radical***

*Bernard D. N. Grebanier*

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS AND REVIEWS

---

**SCIENCE & SOCIETY**

30 East 20th St., New York City

I enclose ONE DOLLAR for one year's subscription.

(Canada, \$1.25; Foreign \$1.50)

Name .....

Address .....

Please mention *The American Quarterly* on the Soviet Union.



# SOCIAL WORK *Today*

In recent years social services have grown, particularly through government support, until today about one million persons are engaged professionally in all its branches throughout the country. Working day by day with the "end products" of social and economic maladjustment social workers are beginning to re-examine and analyze their role in society.

SOCIAL WORK TODAY is the organ of the progressives in the field who believe that they "must look up from their pre-occupation with individuals to see what is happening to them, to all of us, in society . . . and that they must try to do something about it."

SOCIAL WORK TODAY offers its readers a living account of the most significant developments in the field—and points the way to still more significant social aspirations and accomplishments.

---

NO NEWS STAND SALE . BY SUBSCRIPTION ONLY

---

SOCIAL WORK TODAY . 6 East 46th Street . N. Y. C.

Please enroll me as a subscriber for one year (nine issues) beginning with *October*.

☐ I enclose \$1.50


☐ Bill me for \$1.50

Name .....

Address .....

Please mention *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*.

# SOVIET LINENS



ARE SOLD BY ALL LEADING  
DEPARTMENT STORES AND SPECIALTY  
SHOPS AND  
ARE KNOWN FOR THEIR DURABILITY AND  
LONG WEAR

---

MADE OF FINEST PURE FLAX YARNS ONLY

---

## HOUSEHOLD LINENS:

KITCHEN TOWELS, TOWELLING in popular sizes with attractive colored borders, HUCK TOWELS, DAMASK TOWELS, DAMASK TABLE CLOTHS, SETS AND NAPKINS in most popular sizes, attractive designs, hemmed or hemstitched, white, white with colored borders and in solid colors.

EMBROIDERED LINENS for your table, HAND BLOCKED AND MACHINE PRINTED LINENS FOR DRAPES AND UPHOLSTERY NEEDS, WHITE LINEN PIECE GOODS, CRASH LINENS, etc.

---

*Imported by:*

**Amtorg Trading Corporation**

261 Fifth Avenue, N.Y.C.

Please mention *The American Quarterly* on the Soviet Union.

# A UNIQUE TRAVEL SERVICE in a new world .... THE USSR



The SOVIET UNION visited for the first time is a truly dynamic experience in which INTOURIST's excellent all-inclusive service plays no small part. The SOVIET UNION revisited provides a thrill and pleasure that is inspired by advancement in every conceivable phase of SOVIET life. Ten years of constantly improving standards of service have made INTOURIST an organization worthy of assisting the foreign visitor through the magnificent country it serves.

The teeming regenerated cities, the Caucasus Mountains, the Ukraine, the Black Sea Riviera, the valley of the Volga are all indisputably glorious travel lands. Through INTOURIST you may enjoy them to the fullest possible extent.

New hotels, improved trains, re-arranged itineraries will heighten the enjoyment of your SOVIET journey. This year's traveler will find extended sightseeing schedules in all categories of service, with special emphasis on third class which now includes an additional sightseeing feature each day. Should you plan a visit during the fall and winter you will find every phase of the dynamic SOVIET Theatre-World astir with activity. Schools, institutes and universities are all in full swing and there is an abundance of colorful Winter Sports.

INTOURIST daily all-inclusive service (transportation on tour, hotels, meals, sightseeing, guide-interpreters, etc.) is based on standard rates of \$15, first class; \$8, tourist; \$5, third.

*October 15-April 15, 20% reduction on above rates.*



545 Fifth Avenue, New York  
360 No. Michigan Avenue, Chicago  
756 So. Broadway, Los Angeles

## SEE YOUR TRAVEL AGENT

Please mention *The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*.

# ASIA

The Magazine  
of the Orient

The headline writers on Far Eastern affairs write for ASIA. Such names as Walter Duranty, Nathaniel Pfeffer, Maurice Hindus, Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong, Lowell Thomas appear on ASIA's Table of Contents page regularly. Most of the famous writers on trans-Pacific subjects have used ASIA as the medium for expressing their opinions and telling their stories. Many published their first work in ASIA.

And there are names with a different sound in ASIA Magazine. Most sound unfamiliar to English-speaking people. They are the names of Asia's own writers. They write about their homes, their parents, their own problems and their countries' problems. The voice of Asia speaks in ASIA Magazine in its own words, using its own tones, seeing from its own point of view. Recent issues of ASIA feature articles by, among many others, Professor M. Ziauddin, Jack Chen, Nermin Muvaffak, Bunji Omura, Ameen Rihani, S. Satyamurti, Dr. Khalil Wakim.

No other magazine published in English presents the diversity of point of view which ASIA's contributors bring to the study of the life and problems of the peoples of the continent of Asia. There is not an important Asiatic writer who has not contributed to ASIA. There is not an oriental country—except Tannu Tuva—whose nationals are not among its contributors.

*Published Monthly*

*\$4 a year*

40 East 49th Street, New York, N. Y.

*Please mention The American Quarterly on the Soviet Union.*